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COPYRIGHT-CoPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976-OPERATING SYSTEM
COMPUTER PROGRAMS EXPRESSED IN OBJECT CODE AND
STORED ON ROM ARE COPYRIGHTABLE
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. (1983)
Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) is a California corporation1 engaged in
the manufacture and sale of personal computers, 2 peripheral equipment,
3
and computer programs.4 Until 1982, Apple manufactured the Apple II
1. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984)
(withdrawn pursuant to Rule 53 of the Supreme Court Rules). Apple, incorporated
in 1976, has grown quickly to become a recognized industry leader. 714 F.2d at 1242.
When this action was commenced in 1982, Apple had already sold more than
400,000 Apple II computers, and had net sales totaling $335 million for the 1981
fiscal year. Id.
2. 714 F.2d at 1242. Personal computers, also called "microcomputers" because
of their size and relative versatility, contain a variety of integrated circuits. 545 F.
Supp. at 812-13. These circuits are photo-chemically imprinted silicon chips, which
are mounted on a large flat circuit board called a "mother board." Id at 813. The
various processes of personal computers are managed by a central processing unit
(CPU), a specialized circuit that executes all programs. Id The CPU does the pri-
mary calculations required of all programs and shifts answers to other parts of the
system. Id All instructions for the CPU are contained on computer programs. 714
F.2d at 1243. For a discussion of the composition and operation of personal com-
puters, see N. CHAPIN, COMPUTERS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (1971); W. DAVIS, IN-
FORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 48 (2d ed. 1981); U. POOCH & R. CHATTrERGY,
MINICOMPUTERS (1980). For a detailed nontechnical description of the functions
and interrelationships of the various components of a microcomputer, see Note, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Programs in Read Only Memog Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
329 (1982).
3. 714 F.2d at 1242. "Peripheral equipment" refers to the physical parts of a
computer other than the CPU, such as the keyboard, screen, printer, and disk drives.
545 F. Supp. at 814.
4. 714 F.2d at 1242. Computer programs, also known as "software," are gener-
ally defined as detailed sets of instructions that direct the computer to perform cer-
tain tasks or to solve certain problems. 545 F. Supp. at 813-14. While there is some
controversy over the specific definition of software, an increasingly well-accepted def-
inition focuses on three essential elements of all computer programs: (1) the underly-
ing idea or process upon which the program is based (also known as the
"algorithm"); (2) the program itself coded in some programming language; and
(3) the supporting documentation, such as flow charts, instructional manual and
other materials that explain the operation of the program. Keplinger, Computer
Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 484-85 (1981) (citing
MODEL PROVISIONS ON THE PROTECTION OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE 12 (World In-
tellectual Property Org. 1978)). See also Davidson, Protecting Computer Software." 4 Com-
prehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS 339 (1983) (defining software as "all materials
encompassing or describing computer programs").
Generally, the creation of a computer program occurs in four stages. Pope &
Pope, Protection of Propreta~y Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV. 527, 530
(1979). The first stage is the development of a flow chart or graphic representation of
the program's logic. Id. The flow chart expresses the algorithm, which is the mathe-
(894)
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personal home computer. 5 Independent programmers, working under con-
tract with Apple, developed numerous application programs 6 designed to be
used on the Apple II. 7 To achieve compatibility with the Apple II, the appli-
cation programs were formulated in accordance with the Apple II's internal
operating system programs.8 These operating system programs are ex-
matical expression of the solution to a given problem. Id. The second phase is the
development of a "source program," which is a translation of the flow chart into a
high-level, human-oriented programming language such as FORTRAN (FORmula
TRANslation), COBOL (Common Business Oriented Language) or BASIC (Begin-
ners All-purpose Symbolic Instruction Code). Id These high-level languages use
common words and mathematical symbols to perform different functions. Id Source
programs may be punched on decks of cards or imprinted on disks, magnetic tapes,
or drums. Id The third phase is the development of an "assembly program," which
is a translation of the programming language into machine language, or mechani-
cally readable numerical computer language. Id. at 530-31. Finally, the fourth phase
is the development of an "object program," which translates the assembly program
into a series of electrical impulses that interact directly with the machine. Id at 531.
For a further discussion of the various phases of computer programs, see Davidson,
supra; Gemignani, Legal Protection for Software: The View.From '79, 7 RUGERS J. COM-
PUTERS, TECH. & L. 269 (1980); Comment, The Protection of Property Rights in Computer
Software, 14 AKRON L. REV. 85 (1980); Comment, Copyright Protection for Programs
Stored in Computer Chips: Competing with IBM and Apple, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 103
(1984); Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 47 TENN. L. REV. 787
(1980); Note, supra note 2.
5. 714 F.2d at 1242.
6. Id. All computer programs can be classified, according to their functions, as
either "application programs" or "operating system programs." Id. at 1243. Appli-
cation programs, which comprise the great majority of all software, are inserted into
the computer to perform specific tasks, such as making calculations, tabulating data,
producing graphics, word processing, or playing games. Id. These programs are gen-
erally written in high-level programming languages, and are designed to be under-
standable to even the unsophisticated computer user. 545 F. Supp. at 814. For a
discussion of operating system programs, see note 8 infra.
7. 714 F.2d at 1242. As a result of its early success, Apple has been able to
develop, through the services of independent programmers, a vast body of applica-
tion programs that are available for use with the Apple II computer. Petition for
Certiorari at 4, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). In 1983, it was reported that
15,000 programs have been independently developed for the Apple II computer.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, at F2, col. 1. It is generally acknowledged that the avail-
ability and variety of application programs designed to run on a particular computer
are the major considerations in a consumer's decision to purchase a particular make
of computer. 545 F. Supp. at 814.
8. 545 F. Supp. at 814. The application programs designed specifically for use
in the Apple II will not run on computers utilizing different operating system pro-
grams. Id. Operating system programs coordinate the various components of the
computer system to enable it to execute application programs. See Note, supra note 2,
at 546-47 (citations omitted).
Operating system programs "consist of routines that electronically activate a
computer and manage the various internal housekeeping functions that a computer
must perform in order to run any application program. Operating systems are, in
short, a computer's technological life support system." Petition for Certiorari at 3,
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). For a description of the functions performed by the
operating system programs involved in the principal case, see note 14 tnfra.
1983-84]
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pressed in object code9 and are stored on flexible magnetic disks called
"floppy disks" or in silicon chips called Read Only Memory (ROM).' °
Since 1979, Apple has sought to protect its operating system programs by
registering them with the United States Copyright Office.II
Franklin Computer Corp. (Franklin) is a Pennsylvania corporation
which manufactured and marketed the ACE 100 personal computer. 12 The
ACE 100 was designed to be "Apple compatible," so that the peripheral
9. 714 F.2d at 1243. Computer programs, both application and operating sys-
tems, may be written in one of three programming languages. Id High-level lan-
guages, such as FORTRAN or BASIC, which contain easily understood English
words and phrases, are used by programmers when initially designing a program. Id
The next language level, referred to as "assembly language," is made up of alphanu-
meric labels. Id The high-level languages and assembly languages are collectively
referred to as "source code." Id A computer, however, cannot read source code; it
can only understand instructions written in a machine language called "object code,"
a binary expression utilizing only the two symbols, I and 0. Id These symbols indi-
cate the opening and closing of switches governing electrical impulses within the cen-
tral processing unit of the computer. Id. Special operating system programs that
translate source code into machine-readable object code are known as "compiler pro-
grams." Id For a discussion of the distinction between source code and object code,
see Gagliardi, Software. What Is It?, 8 APLA Q.J. 233, 238-39 (1980); Stern, Another
Look at Copyright Protection of Software. Did the 1980 Act Do Anythingfor Object Code., 3
Computer L.J. 1 (1981); Note, The Copyrightabiity of Object Code, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 412 (1984). For a general discussion of the levels of programming languages,
see Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1723
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Object Code Protection]; Note, supra note 2.
10. 714 F.2d at 1243. Memory is the part of the computer that stores informa-
tion for later use. See Note, supra note 2. There are a variety of memory devices used
in computers. The main memory component is called the Random Access Memory
(RAM) which is a volatile internal memory chip that is erased when the power of the
computer is turned off. 714 F.2d at 1243 n.3. See also 545 F. Supp. at 813. Another
type of memory device is the Read Only Memory, or ROM, which is a permanent
internal device consisting of a semi-conductor silicon chip incorporated into the cir-
cuitry of the computer. 714 F.2d at 1243. The ROM contains the object code for a
particular program. Id. As its name suggests, information stored on a ROM cannot
be erased or changed in any way. Id Another memory device commonly used is the
"floppy disk" or diskette, a flexible magnetic disk resembling a phonograph record,
which is inserted into and read by the computer. Id. See generally Stern, ROMs in
Search of a Remedy: Will They Find It?, 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 4 (1982).
11. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). The process
of copyright registration is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 408-
410 (1982). Generally, a claim to copyright may be made by any person by register-
ing the work with an application and payment of the set fee. Id. §§ 408, 708. A
number of requirements must be met before a copyright registration certificate will
be issued, including subject-matter suitability and originality. 1 M. NIMMER, NIM-
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (1983). For a discussion of the Copyright Office policy of
accepting computer programs for copyright registration, see note 62 thfra.
As owner of the copyright, Apple had the exclusive right to reproduce the copy-
righted programs. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
12. 714 F.2d at 1243. Franklin, incorporated in 1981, had sold approximately
1,000 computers, and had gross sales totaling $7 million at the commencement of this
action. Id See also Zonana, Apple's Copyright Protection Victoty Seen as Blow to Frankh
Computer, Others, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1983, § 1, at 2, col. 3.
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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equipment and, more importantly, the application programs developed spe-
cifically for use in the Apple II could be run on the ACE 100 as well.' 3 To
achieve this compatibility, Franklin designers copied fourteen copyrighted
operating systems of the Apple I1.14
On May 12, 1982, Apple filed suit in the United States District Court
13. 714 F.2d at 1243. More accurately, the ACE 100 was designed to be com-
patible with Apple-compatible software as it was specifically designed to utilize the
thousands of application programs that had been developed by independent pro-
grammers for use on the Apple II. 545 F. Supp. at 814-15. The availability and
variety of these programs were the major incentives behind the development of the
ACE 100 in 1982. Id at 814.
The founders of Franklin recognized the need in the market for an "Apple-
compatible" computer, that is, a computer with hardware and operating
systems designed so that it could run the broad range of application pro-
grams that heretofore could be run only on the Apple II computer and use
the peripheral hardware originally developed for use in conjunction with
the Apple II. Franklin's objective was to respond to that market demand
with such a compatible computer, but one that had enhanced capabilities
as well.
Brief for Appellee at 7, Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
14. 714 F.2d at 1245. Franklin never denied having copied the programs. Id
Franklin had been advised by its legal counsel that Apple's operating systems were an
integral part of the Apple II technology and were thus not subject to copyright pro-
tection. Petition for Certiorari at 5, Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). Franklin had also commissioned a study to deter-
mine the feasibility of redesigning the Apple operating systems without losing com-
patibility with Apple-compatible application programs, and concluded that redesign
was not possible without losing compatibility. Id. "[Aipplication programs designed
to run on the Apple II assume and depend upon the precise order and sequence of
the electrical signals that constitute the [operating systems]; the programs will not
run if there is any variance in the signal." Brief for Appellee at 7-8, Apple Computer,
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). Thus, Franklin
concluded that the only way to design a computer capable of utilizing the thousands
of programs developed for use with the Apple II was to use the same operating sys-
tems found in the Apple II. Id at 8.
The fourteen operating system programs copied by Franklin were described by
the Third Circuit as follows:
(1) Autostart ROM is sold as part of the Apple Computer and is embed-
ded on a ROM chip. . . . When the computer's power is turned on, Autos-
tart ROM performs internal routines that turn on the circuits in the
computer and make its physical parts . . . ready for use.
(2) Applesoft is Apple's version of the. . . BASIC language. The pro-
gram is stored in ROM and is sold as part of the computer. Applesoft
translates instructions written on the higher-level BASIC language into the
lower-level machine code that the computer understands.
(3) Floating-Point BASIC is the same program as Applesoft but is
stored on disks rather than on ROMs. It is used in earlier versions of the
Apple II computer that did not have the Apple soft program in ROM.
(4) Apple Integer BASIC, another translation program, is stored on the
DOS 3.3 Master Disk [and] . . . implements a simpler version of the Ap-
plesoft program.
(5) DOS 3.3, the disk operating system program, provides the instruc-
tions necessary to control the operation between the disk system (disk drive)
and the computer itself. It controls the reading and writing functions of the
1983-84]
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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that Franklin was liable for
copyright infringement. 15 Franklin answered by raising as an affirmative de-
fense the invalidity of Apple's copyrights, contending that the programs
disks and includes other routines which put all the data transfers in se-
quence.
(6) Master Create is stored on a disk. When a disk is prepared for use
the DOS 3.3 program is placed on that disk in a form that is dependent on
the amount of Random Access Memory (RAM) available. The Master
Create program replaces the DOS 3.3 on the disk with a version that is
independent of the amount of RAM available.
(7) Copy, which is stored on a disk, enables the user to copy programs
written in Apple Integer BASIC from one disk to another.
(8) Copy A, also stored on a disk, enables the user to copy programs
written in Applesoft from one disk to another.
(9) Copy OBJO contains a file of subroutines used by the Copy and
Copy A programs.
(10) Chabi, another disk stored program, allows data to be passed be-
tween different parts of a program when only one part of the program is in
RAM at a given time. Thus, Chain preserves data already stored in RAM
while another part of the program is being loaded into RAM.
(11) Hello, also disk stored, is the first progiam executed after the
power is turned on and a disk is ready for use. It determines how much
RAM is in the computer and which version of BASIC needs to be loaded
into the computer.
(12) Boot 13 is stored on a disk and sold on a Master Disk. It allows
the user having a disk controller card that contains the Apple 16-Sector
Boot ROM to use older versions of the Apple disk operating system.
(13) Apple 13-Sector Boot ROMis stored in a ROM located on the disk
controller card plugged into the Mother Board. By turning on numerous
circuits on the card and in the Apple II computer, this program causes
other parts of the disk operating system used for 13-Sector format disks to
load.
(14) Apple 16-Sector Boot ROM, stored in a ROM located on the disk
controller card, turns on numerous circuits on the card and in the Apple II
computer and causes other parts of the disk operating system used for 16-
Sector format disks to load. It therefore enables the user to start or permit
the running of another program or to prepare the computer to receive a
program.
714 F.2d at 1244 n.4. Apple estimated that these programs were developed over a 46-
month period, at a cost of more than $740,000, not including the costs of the develop-
ment of antecedent programs or the costs of marketing. Id at 1245. It is generally
accepted that the costs of duplicating programs is minimal, particularly when com-
pared with the high cost of initial research and development. Id at 1254.
The process that Franklin allegedly utilized in copying the programs described
above was explained as follows:
To copy Apple's program stored on ROM, Franklin's Chairman . . . , us-
ing his own Apple computer, transferred the program into part of the RAM
memory in the same computer, and then transferred the entire program to
a PROM chip using a plug-in device (called a "ROM burner"). To copy
Apple's programs stored on diskettes, Franklin's Vice-President of Engineer-
ing inserted the Apple diskette into his computer and copied the programs
onto a blank diskette by running Apple's copy program.
Appellant's Opening Brief at 7 n.5, Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
15. 714 F.2d at 1244. Apple further alleged that Franklin was liable for patent
infringement, unfair competition and misappropriation. Id However, the district
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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were not copyrightable. 16 Apple moved for a preliminary injunction to re-
strain Franklin from the use, sale, or infringement of Apple's registered copy-
rights.17 The district court denied the injunction, based on its expressed
doubt as to the copyrightability of the programs 18 and its conclusion that
court did not reach or address these allegations, as Apple's motion for a preliminary
injunction was limited to the alleged copyright infringement. 545 F. Supp. at 817.
16. 714 F.2d at 1244. Franklin argued that the copyrights were invalid because
the programs failed to meet the statutory requirements for copyrightability. Id For
a discussion of the district court's disposition of this contention, see note 18 infra.
17. 714 F.2d at 1245. For a discussion of the district court's formulation of the
standards for granting a preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement case, see
note 19 infra. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reversal on this issue, see notes
122-24 and accompanying text infa.
Before ruling on Apple's motion, the district court held a three-day evidentiary
hearing on the question of the copyrightability of the operating system programs in
suit. 714 F.2d at 1245. Apple produced evidence in the form of expert testimony to
the effect that the operating system programs of the ACE 100 were virtually identical
to those of the Apple II. Id. Franklin did not deny the copying charge, but defended
on the factual ground that it was not feasible for Franklin to develop operating pro-
grams capable of running Apple-compatible application programs. Id For a discus-
sion of Franklin's feasibility studies, see note 14 supra. For a discussion of the district
court's characterization and resolution of the issue, see note 18 infa.
18. 545 F. Supp. at 812. The district court stated that Apple took the "not
implausible" position that Franklin had stolen the logic and structure of Apple's op-
erating system programs as expressed on the ROM found in the Apple II computer.
Id at 815, 819-20 (emphasis added). Franklin's contention, as characterized by the
court, was that a system compatible with Apple-compatible software must necessarily
share a great deal of Apple's essential internal structure including the operating system
programs. Id at 815 (emphasis added).
The district court noted the statutory requirements for copyrightability, an
"original work of authorship" and a "fixed . . . medium of expression." Id at 816
n.4 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)). For a discussion of the statutory requirements,
see notes 66-73 and accompanying text in/ia. The court found two aspects of operat-
ing system programs in object code encoded on ROMs that potentially preclude their
copyrightability. First, the district court found that a ROM is properly characterized
as a "mechanical device." 545 F. Supp. at 823. When the ROM is engaged in a
computer, it "become[s] an essential part of the mechanical process." Id. (quoting
Keplinger, Computer Intellectual ftoperty Claims, 1977 WASH. L.Q. 461, 464). As a
mechanical device, according to the district court, a ROM would be protected by
patent, rather than copyright law. Id at 824.
Second, the district court stated that "the scope of copyright is limited to mate-
rial that can claim an underlying expressive or communicative purpose." Id The
court acknowledged that some computer programs, even those written in object code,
may satisfy this standard, if the purpose of the program is to produce an image that
can be perceived and understood by a human audience. Id. at 825 (citing Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. II1. 1982), affd, 704 F.2d 1009
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983)). However, the court observed that operat-
ing system programs, which interact only with the computer itself, fail the standard,
since they do not communicate directly with human beings. Id at 821, 825. The
court characterized operating system programs as "an essential part of the machine,"
the part that makes the computer run. Id. at 821. The court stated:
If the concept of "language" means anything, it means an ability to create
human interaction. It is the fixed expression of this that the copyright law
protects, and only this. To go beyond the bounds of this protection would
be ultimately to provide copyright protection to the programs created by a
computer to run other computers. With that, we step into the world of
1983-841
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Apple had failed to show a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and
sufficient irreparable harm.1 9 On appeal, the Third Circuit 20 reversed, hold-
ing that operating system programs, written in object code and embedded on
a ROM chip, are copyrightable. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frankh'n Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
The United States Constitution provides the Congress with the "Power
. . . To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries." 2 ' Federal legislation enacted pursuant to
Gulliver where horses are "human" because they speak a language that
sound remarkably like the ones humans use. It is an intriguing analogy but
false.
Id at 825. For a discussion of the genesis of the test of communicative ability as a
prerequisite for copyright, see notes 46-48 and accompanying text infra. For a discus-
sion of the Third Circuit's response to the proposition that "expression" under
§§ 10 1-102 must be directed at a human audience, see notes 103-06 and accompany-
ing text znfra.
Shortly after the district court entered its order denying Apple's motion for a
preliminary injunction, the Third Circuit decided the case of Williams Electronics,
Inc. v. Artic Inxt'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (application programs written in
object code on ROMs copyrightable). Apple moved for reconsideration in light of
the Wilhams decision. 714 F.2d at 1245. The district court denied the motion, stating
that Wi//jams did not address the operating system program issues raised by the Ap-
ple case. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., No. 82-2107 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 14, 1982) (memorandum and order). For a discussion of WI/hams, see notes 86-
89 and accompanying text infra.
19. 545 F. Supp. at 812. The district court delineated the requirements for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction as follows:
1. A reasonable probability of success on the merits;
2. Irreparable injury to the plaintiff that exceeds any injury to the en-
joined defendant;
3. The improbability of harm to other interested persons; and,
4. A public interest that would be furthered.
Id. at 825 (citing Delaware River Port Auth. v. Transamerican Trailer Transport,
501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)). The court, after expressing its doubts as to
Apple's probability of success on the merits, also noted that Apple was better suited
to withstand any injury suffered during litigation than was Franklin to withstand the
"devastating effect" a preliminary injunction would have upon its business. 545 F.
Supp. at 825.
On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed with the application of the standard for
a preliminary injunction posited by the district court. 714 F.2d at 1254. For a dis-
cussion of the Third Circuit's position on the necessity of a showing of irreparable
harm in copyright infringement cases, see notes 122-23 and accompanying text infra.
20. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Hunter, Higginbotham and Sloviter.
Judge Sloviter wrote the opinion for the unanimous panel.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is the basis of congressional author-
ity to enact both copyright and patent laws. See M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.02.
The Patent Act grants patent holders "the right to exclude others from making,
using or selling the invention throughout the United States" for seventeen years from
the date of the issuance of the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982). The protection offered
under the Patent Act extends to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982). In addition to § 101's requirements of novelty and usefulness, § 103
adds a third requirement, nonobviousness: "A patent may not be obtained . . . if
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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this authority provides that any unauthorized copying of a properly copy-
. ..the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention
was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See
also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (novelty, utility, and nonobvious-
ness are explicit conditions of patentability). The difficulty, expense, and time re-
quired for an applicant to establish these criteria, and the limitation of protection to
17 years, make patent protection an unattractive alternative if copyright protection is
available. See generally Pope & Pope, supra note 4; Nycum, Legal Protection for Computer
Programs, I COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1978); Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in
Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 547
(1982).
In addition to the difficulties of the stringent standards for patentability in gen-
eral, it is unclear whether patent protection is available for computer programs at all.
Pope & Pope, supra note 4, at 534-42. The Patent Act is silent on its applicability to
computer programs, and judicial decisions in the area have left the question un-
resolved. Id. The Supreme Court has had several occasions upon which to make a
determination on the patentability of computer programs, but has not yet made a
definitive ruling. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). In Diehr, the
Court upheld the validity of a patent on a synthetic rubber curing process which
consisted of several steps including a formula for calculating appropriate cure time
with the use of a digital computer. Id at 178. The fact that the process was based
primarily upon the use of a computer program was significant, because the Court
had previously held that an algorithm, a procedure for solving a given type of mathe-
matical problem, was not, of itself, patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 434 U.S. 1033
(1978) (algorithm not patentable); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (method
for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary form not patentable,
since effect would be to grant monopoly over mathematical formula). While Diehr
did not hold that algorithms and computer programs are per se patentable, the rul-
ing indicates that an algorithm may be given patent protection if it is used in a
"process" that fits within the scope of the Patent Act's protection. See Diehr, 450 U.S.
at 178, Some commentators have read Diehr as illustrative of the Supreme Court's
willingness to sustain the patentability of program-related inventions. See Keplinger,
supra note 4; Note, Protection of PropretaOy Rights in Computer Programs: A "Basic"
Formula for Debugging the System, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 92 (1982). For a discussion of
the impact of Diehr on patentability of computer programs, see generally Comment,
Copyright Protection for Video Games, Computer Programs and Other Cybernetic Works, 5
CoM./ENTERT. L.J. 477 (1983); Note, Patentability of Computer Programs, 34 BAYLOR L.
REV. 125 (1982); Note, A Patent Claim Based Primarily on a Computer Program Can Com-
prise Patentable Subject Matter, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 381 (1981); Note, The Patentability
of Processes and Incorporated Algorithms, 8 OHio N.U.L. REV. 535 (1982); Note, Patenta-
bihty of a Process that Includes a Programmed Digital Computer.- The Court Invents a New
Standard, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 157 (1981). For a general discussion of the applica-
bility of patent law to computers, computer programs, and program-related inven-
tions, see Bender, Computer Programs. Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
214 (1968); Davis, Computer Programs and Subject Matter Patentability, 6 RUTGERS J.
COMPUTERS & L. 1 (1977); Kayton, Update of Legal Protection of Computer Software Via
Patents, 8 APLA Q.J. 273 (1980); Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer
Software Patentabiity: A Scientiic View of a Legal Problem, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS
TECH. & L. 313 (1980); Comment, Computer Software, supra note 4; Comment, Patenta-
biliy: Piecing Together the Computer Software Patent Puzzle, 19 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 3351
(1975); Note, Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1541 (1968); Note, Patentable Subject Matter-Computer Software, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 975 (1979); Note, The Patentabiity of Computer Programs, 38
N.Y.U. L. REV. 891 (1963); Note, An Anomaly in the Patent System.: The Uncertain Status
of Computer Software, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 273 (1980); Note, Ade-
quate Legal Protection for Computer Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 369.
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 12
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss3/12
902 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29: p. 894
righted work constitutes a copyright infringement.2 2 Congress has continu-
ally expanded the scope of copyright protection in response to new
developments and advancements in communication technology.2 3 How-
22. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(a), 501 (1982). For a discussion of the scope of copy-
right protection afforded by the 1976 Copyright Act, see notes 65-73 and accompany-
ing text infa. For a discussion of the history of federal copyright legislation see note
23 infta.
Although the 1976 Copyright Act does not specifically define "infringement," it
provides that a violation of a copyright holder's exclusive rights constitutes an in-
fringement. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). Unauthorized copying is generally recog-
nized as inconsistent with the exclusive right of a copyright holder to control
reproduction of the copyrighted work. See 3 M. Nimmer, supra note 11, § 13.01. To
establish a case of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove that he owned the
copyright, and that there was "copying" by the defendant. Id Possession of a copy-
right certificate constitutes prima facie evidence of ownership. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(1982). The certificate of copyright registration is prima facie evidence of the validity
of the copyright. Id
23. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprited in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5664 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1476]. The grad-
ual expansion of the protective coverage of the various copyright statutes has mainly
been due to the rapid technological changes that have taken place in the last century.
Id The House Report states:
The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in the types
of works accorded protection. . . . [T]echnological developments have
made possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before. In
some of these cases the new expressive forms-electronic music, filmstrips,
and computer programs, for example-could be regarded as an extension
of copyrightable subject matter Congress had already intended to protect,
and were thus considered copyrightable from the outset without the need of
new legislation. In other cases, such as photographs, sound recordings, and
motion pictures, statutory enactment was deemed necessary to give them
full recognition as copyrightable works.
Id
The first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, protected only "maps, charts, and
books." Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Gradually, through amendments
and revisions, copyright protection was extended to newly developed forms of expres-
sion and communication: Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (designs, etchings,
engravings); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (musical compositions); Act of
Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (dramatic compositions); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch.
126, 13 Stat. 540 (photographs and negatives); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat.
198 (statutes and models).
In 1909, Congress enacted a complete revision of the copyright statute, ex-
tending copyright protection to "all the writings of an author." Act of Mar. 4, 1909,
ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976). The legislative history of the 1909 Act indi-
cates that Congress was concerned that the term "author" could be too narrowly
construed by courts and intended to provide the fullest possible protection. See H.R.
REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1909). It was suggested that the term
"works" be substituted, thus evidencing this intent more clearly, "but it was thought
better to use the word 'writings', which is the word found in the Constitution." Id
The 1909 Act faced new interpretive problems with the development of radio, mo-
tion pictures, television, and other revolutionary forms of technological expression.
See Note, Revision of the Copyright Law, 51 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1938) (arguing that a
revision of the 1909 Act was necessary to provide protection for emerging technol-
ogy). See also Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 660 (2d
Cir. 1955) (questioning in dictum congressional intent to extend copyright protection
to publicly-performed musical compositions). For a discussion of the problems en-
9
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ever, because the scope of protection afforded under the various copyright
acts is limited by the constitutional authorization, "writings" of "authors"
has remained the essential criteria of copyrightability.
24
Generally, courts have construed both "authors" and "writings"
broadly in extending copyright protection to a variety of forms of expression
beyond the strictly written word. 25 In upholding the copyrightability of
photographs in the case of Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,2 6 the
Supreme Court defined "writings" as all forms "by which the ideas in the
gendered by the 1909 Act, see generally A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 9, 22
(1979).
In 1976, the 1909 Act was repealed and replaced by a new act which extends
copyright protection to all "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression." Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat.
2541, 2544-45 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
For a discussion of the history of the 1976 Act, see notes 63-73 and accompanying
text thfra.
24. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 11, §§ 1.06, 1.08. The constitutional standard
is discernible in the current formulation of the scope of copyrightability: "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1982). The term "author" is the basis for the requirement of originality. See, e.g.,
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (defining "author"
as "[h]e to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker"). The requirement of a
"writing" has evolved into a basic requirement that a work exist in some physical,
tangible mode. See id. See generaly Note, Study ofthe Term "Writtgs" in the Copyrght
Clause of the Consttution, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1263 (1956).
25. See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (sound recordings);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (statuettes); Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (commercial lithographic circus poster); Walt Dis-
ney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (cartoon characters), cert.
dented, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Edwin K. Williams & Co. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co.-
East, 542 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1976) (account books containing instructions on use of
forms), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977).
26. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The copyright statute in effect in Burrow-Cites included
"photographs" as one of the classes of copyrightable works. Id at 56. The plaintiff
brought suit against a lithographic company for violating the plaintiff's copyright in
a photograph of Oscar Wilde. Id. at 54. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff, and
the defendant appealed, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional, since a photo-
graph was not a "writing" of an "author" in the constitutional sense. Id at 55-56.
Emphasizing the interpretive flexibility of constitutional provisions, and the in-
clusion in copyright statutes of protectible works that were not literally "writings,"
the Court concluded that photographs, as "original intellectual conceptions of an
author," satisfied the constitutional standard. Id The Court analyzed the constitu-
tional question by referring to the copyright statutes enacted in 1790 and 1802, both
of which included among protected works maps, charts, designs, engravings, and
other prints, as well as books. Id at 57. The Court stated that "[t]he construction
placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the act of 1802, by the men
who were contemporary with its formation, many of whom were members of the
convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to very great weight." Id. Thus, the
Court concluded that unless photographs were of a completely different genre than
any of the groups of works protected in the original statutes, there was no reason to
believe that Congress could not extend protection to them as well, for as the Court
aptly noted, "[t]he only reason why photographs were not included in the extended
list in the act of 1802 is probably that they did not exist. . . ... Id at 58.
1983-84]
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mind of an author are given visible expression, ' 27 and "author" as "he to
whom anything owes its origin."' 28 Under this formulation, neither a work's
lack of artistic merit nor its commercial nature,2 9 nor even its failure to ex-
press a recognizable idea or sentiment precludes copyright protection.
30
Thus, in Reiss v. National Quolaion Bureau,31 Judge Learned Hand found that
a code book containing a list of meaningless words was copyrightable. 32 Ad-
27. Id at 58. Thus, the Burrow-Giles Court rejected the suggestion that a work
must be printed in words on a page to be eligible for copyright protection. Id. at 53.
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions reaffirmed the broad construction of
"writings." See American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907). In
upholding the copyrightability of paintings, the Werckmeister Court stated that the
foundation of copyright law lies in the protection of ideas embodied in visible forms.
Id. at 290-91. More recently, the Court has observed that "writings... include any
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor." Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). Federal courts have generally followed the
Supreme Court's broad view of "writings." See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954) (statutettes); Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) (handwriting anal-
ysis chart). See generally, Note, supra note 24.
28. 111 U.S. at 58. The Burrow-Giles Court's reference to "origin" is viewed by
most commentators as the basis for the requirement of originality. See 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 11, § 1.06[A]. In essence, the requirement became that of emanation from
an ascertainable source, reflecting the constitutional standard that a work owe its
origin to an author. Id Until the enactment of the 1976 Act, the requirement of
originality was characterized as a judicially created gloss upon the copyright statute.
See Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Although
the Copyright Act [of 1909] nowhere expressly invokes the requirement of originality,
courts have uniformly inferred this from the constitutional and statutory condition of
authorship."). In the 1976 Act, Congress for the first time specifically referred to
originality as a statutory requirement. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). For a discus-
sion of the requirement of originality in the 1976 Act, see notes 66-67 and accompa-
nying text thn/a.
29. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1902). In Bleis-
rein, the Court upheld the copyrightability of a commercial circus poster, noting that
the requisite degree of creative effort necessary for copyrightability could be fulfilled
by "a very modest grade of art." Id. at 250. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
observed that it should not be the province of the judiciary to determine what is or is
not appropriately artistic: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustra-
tions, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Id. at 251.
30. See Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D. N.Y. 1921). For a
discussion of Reiss, see notes 31-32 and accompanying text infra.
31. 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). The plaintiff's book, 'Simplex' Pocket Blank
Code, consisted substantively of 6,325 words of five letters each. Id at 718. Although
the words had no recognizable meaning, they were pronounceable. Id They were
intended to be used in the creation of a private cable code: the purchasers could
decide upon the meanings to be given to the code words. Id Judge Hand noted that
while the words had no present meaning, they did "have a prospective meaning, but
as yet they have not received it." Id
32. Id. at 719. Drawing an analogy to concededly copyrightable pattern and
design works, Judge Hand observed that a work's ability to communicate an idea was
not a prerequisite to its classification as a "writing." Id. Judge Hand then applied
this principle to words themselves, finding no reason why ability or failure to commu-
nicate a message should control copyrightability. Id The Reiss defendants argued
that in order to be the "writing of an author" in the constitutional sense, words neces-
sarily must have a definite meaning. Id at 718. Echoing the Burrow-Giles Court's
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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ditional cases have extended copyright protection to a variety of coded
materials and graphic expressions.
33
Despite the broad scope of copyright protection for various forms of
expression and for works exhibiting little creative or intellectual merit, judi-
cially-created limitations have restricted the spectrum of copyrightable
materials. 34 In Baker v. Selden,35 the Supreme Court established two related
limitations on the copyrightability of a work or expression. 36 The first limi-
tation, known as the "utilitarian function" principle, denies copyright pro-
tection to works which are purely utilitarian in nature37 if their value lies in
emphasis on a flexible interpretation of the Constitution, Judge Hand rejected this
narrow interpretation of the constitutional standard:
[I]f our Constitution embalms inflexibly the habits of 1789 there may be
something in the point. But it does not; its grants of power to Congress
comprise, not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men
should devise thereafter. Of course, the new subject matter must have some
relation to the grant; but we interpret it by the general practices of civilized
peoples in similar fields, for it is not a strait-jacket, but a charter for a living
people.
Id. at 719. The code book, Judge Hand concluded, could properly be characterized
as the "writing of an author." Id
33. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1938) (handwriting analysis
chart); Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937) (cable and telegraphic code
book); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929) (freight tariff index table); Ed-
ward & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.) (interest and
discount tables), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 738 (1926); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v.
Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (answer sheets for student
achievement tests, consisting of lines and boxes).
34. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). For a discussion of the utilitarian
function principle and the idea-expression dichotomy established in Baker, see notes
37-40 infra. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
For a discussion of the White-Smith rule of readability, see notes 45-48 and accompa-
nying text n/ra.
35. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
36. Id In Baker, the Court denied copyright protection to a series of blank forms
published in a copyrighted book explaining a system of bookkeeping. Id. at 100. The
plaintiff's book, Selden's Condensed Ledger or Bookkeeping Sinplifed, consisted of an intro-
ductory essay explaining the bookkeeping system, and forms or blanks, consisting of
ruled lines and headings which illustrated the system and its use. Id The system
differed from standard bookkeeping systems in its unique arrangement of columns
and headings, which allowed presentation of a day, a week, or a month's operation
on a single page or adjacent pages. Id. The defendant's book utilized a similar ar-
rangement, but placed the columns on different pages and used different headings.
Id The Court noted that the copyright of the book protected the explanatory essays
only and did not extend to the blank forms themselves. Id at 107.
37. Id at 104-05. The Court distinguished between the description and the use
of the system, noting that while a copyright may prevent a duplication of the descrip-
tion, anybody purchasing the book was free to use the system. Id at 104. Drawing
an analogy to other "arts," the Court noted that a treatise on the composition and
use of certain medicines would be subject to copyright protection, "but no one would
contend that the copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or
manufacture described therein." Id. at 102. The same distinction would apply to a
treatise on the application and mixture of colors for painting, or to the mode of
drawing lines illustrating a book on artistic perspective. Id Similarly, "[t]he copy-
right of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right
1983-84]
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their very usefulness.38 The second limitation, known as the idea-expression
dichotomy, states that a copyright may not be granted in an idea, although
copyright may protect a particular expression of an idea.39 The idea itself
belongs to the world as a whole, and cannot be claimed to be the property of
a single author.40 A corollary to this rule states that where one expression of
an idea constitutes the exclusive medium of communicating that idea, then
the idea and its expression have merged, and the expression may not be
copyrighted. 4 1 Relying on Baker, the First Circuit, in Morrissey v. Procter &
Gamble CO., 4 2 denied copyright protection to a set of sweepstakes rules, since
to the methods of operating which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he em-
ploys to explain them, so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occa-
sion requires." Id at 103.
38. Id. at 105. As a system to be used, the forms in Selden's book were held not
the proper subject of copyright. Id. The Court stated: "The description of the art in
the book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclu-
sive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the
other is use." Id
The utilitarian principle limitation of Baker has been applied to deny copyright
protection to various purely functional items. See, e.g., Brown Instrument Co. v.
Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (calibrated graphic charts, intended for use as
integral parts of a device for mechanically recording temperature, pressure, etc., held
not copyrightable as not intended to convey information, but rather to be used), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98
(7th Cir. 1943) (chart used in connection with a recording thermometer not copy-
rightable because it neither taught nor explained the use of the art but was an essen-
tial element of the machine), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 784 (1944). Not all utilitarian
works, however, have been denied copyrightability. In the leading case of Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954), the Supreme Court upheld a copyright of a statuette that
was utilized as a lamp base. Id. at 217. The Court was careful to note that the
copyright extended only to the statuette, and not to the lamp itself. d. at 218. If the
lamp and statuette ingredient are incapable of being separated, neither could be
copyrighted. Id. See also Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hosp., 155 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 133 (N.D. Il. 1967) (business, medical, legal and other forms are not per se
uncopyrightable; they may be protected by copyright if they convey information).
39. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-01. Nimmer has suggested that this idea-expression
distinction is derived in part from a recognition of the impact of the first amendment
in the area of intellectual property rights, acting as a prohibition on any monopoly
over pure ideas. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.10[B][2]. The first amendment
reflects a commitment to the free exchange of ideas which may conflict with the
restrictions inherent in copyright. See Lee v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887, 893 (1971) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) ("the arena of public debate would be quiet, indeed, if a politician
could copyright his speeches or a philosopher his treatise and thus obtain a monopoly
on the ideas they contained. We should not construe the copyright laws to conflict so
patently with the values that the First Amendment was designed to protect.").
40. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100.
41. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). This
principle is derived from dictum in Baker in which the Court noted that when certain
illustrations and diagrams of a method or art were "necessary incidents" to the ex-
pression of that art, those illustrations and diagrams would belong to the public. See
Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
42. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). In Morrssey, the plaintiff was the owner of a
copyright of a set of sweepstakes rules utilizing participants' social security numbers.
Id at 676. The rules specified that an entrant should print his or her name, address,
and social security number on a boxtop or plain piece of paper, informed entrants
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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those particular rules were virtually the only means of expressing the idea of
the sweepstakes.4 3 Morrissey has come to represent a principle that has par-
ticular relevance in the computer program area: when an idea can be com-
municated either through a single or a very limited set of expressions,
copyright cannot protect any expression of that idea.44
Another judicially-imposed limitation on the scope of copyright protec-
tion, the rule of readability, focused on whether or not a copy has been made
of the protected material in determining whether there was an infringe-
ment.4 5 In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,46 the Supreme
that official contest rules were available upon request, and warned against use of
incorrect social security numbers. Id. at 678. Defendant's set of rules duplicated the
plaintiff's substantially, changing only a few phrases. Id
43. 379 F.2d at 678. The court stated:
When the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that the topic
necessarily requires, if not only one form of expression, at best only a lim-
ited number, to permit copyrighting would mean that a party or parties, by
copyrighting a mer, aandful of forms, could exhaust all possibilities of fu-
ture use of the substance. In such circumstances it does not seem accurate
to say that any particular form of expression comes from the subject matter.
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
44. Id at 678-79. Conversely, however, if an idea can be expressed in a variety
of totally different manners, a variety of copyrights may exist in relation to that idea.
See Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 691 (2d Cir. 1926). The Ninth Circuit enunciated
a standard, which focuses on the extent of the copyright owner's monopoly, to be
applied in cases involving possible merger of idea and expression. See Herbert Rosen-
thal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971). In Kalpakian, the
court held that a piece ofjewelry shaped like a bee was not copyrightable. Id at 742.
The idea (that of a jeweled bee) and the expression of the idea (the jeweled bee itself)
were found inseparable. Id The court characterized the merger inquiry as follows:
"[Firom how large an area of activity did Congress intend to allow the copyright
owner to exclude others? We think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger
private preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in the public market without
a patent." Id
However, the validity of the application of the Momssey rule to computer pro-
grams has been questioned by some commentators. See generally Note, Object Code
Protection, supra note 9, at 1736-37 (there are generally an unlimited number of se-
quences on instructions that could be combined in a program to achieve a single
result; thus there could never be a merger of the idea contained in a given program
and its expression). See also Reznick, Copyright Protection for Computer Formats and the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 8 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 65, 72 (1980) ("the
Morrissey test . . . presumes that a court can determine with reasonable certainty the
finite possibilities of expressions of an idea").
45. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
46. Id In White-Smith, the owner of a copyright on certain musical compositions
alleged infringement by the manufacturer of perforated piano rolls which reproduced
the music written on the copyrighted song sheet. Id. at 9. The piano rolls were used
in player pianos. Id at 10. They consisted of
perforated sheets, which are passed over ducts connected with the operating
parts of the mechanism in such manner that ...[a]s the roll is drawn over
the tracker board, the notes are sounded as the perforations admit the at-
mospheric pressure, the perforations having been so arranged that the effect
is to produce the melody or tune for which the roll has been cut.
Id
The plaintiff sought an injunction against the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
1983-84)
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Court stated that in order to constitute a copy, the alleged copy must be "in
a form which others can see and read," 47 and held that perforated piano
rolls that reproduced music written on copyrighted song sheets were not cop-
ies for infringement purposes, since they could not be perceived and under-
stood by human beings.48 The subsequent extension of the White-Smith
doctrine to exclude phonograph records from copyright protection caused
considerable confusion in the music industry.
49
The first copyright infringement cases involving computer programs
demonstrated the continuing vitality of the Baker and White-Smith doctrines:in Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co.,5 the District Court for the
Northern District of Texas acknowledged that program input formats, which
by their particular placement of words, lines and shaded areas communicate
to the programmer how and where to place data, constitute an "expres-
copyrighted musical compositions on the piano rolls. Id. at 8-9. The defendant ar-
gued that copyright protection extended only to the physical manifestation of the
plaintiff's original idea, i.e., the sheet music representing the musical composition. Id.
at 11-12.
47. Id at 17. The Court stated that " 'a copy is that which comes so near to the
original as to give every person seeing it the idea created by the original.' " Id (quot-
ing West v. Francis, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363 (1822)) (emphasis added by Court).
48. Id. at 17. Based upon expert testimony presented, the Court defined a copy
of a musical work as "a written or printed record of it in intelligible notation." Id
Prior to its being reduced to written or printed form, the Court stated, a musical
composition is an "idea existing in the mind of the composer." Id The Court quoted
with approval from an earlier decision of the First Circuit:
I cannot convince myself that these perforated sheets of paper are copies of
sheet music within the meaning of the copyright law. They are not made to
be addressed to the eye as sheet music, but they form a part of a machine.
They are not designed to be used for such purposes as sheet music, nor do
they in any sense occupy the same field as sheet music. They are a mechan-
ical invention made for the sole purpose of performing tunes mechanically
upon a musical instrument.
Id. at 12 (quoting Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584 (D. Mass. 1888)).
The Court, therefore, concluded that the only "copy" that can be made of a
musical composition is a note-by-note transcription of the music sheet. Id at 17-18.
Such sheets were capable of being read and understood by human beings, while the
series of perforations on a piano roll were not. Id.
49. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); Corcoran v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572 (9th Cir.), cert. denzed, 314
U.S. 687 (1941). In Corcoran, the author of a copyrighted poem alleged infringement
of his copyright by a record producer who used the poem in a drama contained on a
record. Id. at 572, 574. The Ninth Circuit found no infringement, reasoning that the
result was "foreclosed" by the ruling in Whitle-Smith. Id at 573.
50. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). In Synercom, an engineering consulting
firm had developed and copyrighted a stress analysis program to solve complex engi-
neering problems. Id at 1004-05. The program was designed to compute the stress
on each section of a structure when the structure was in actual use. Id. at 1004. In an
action for alleged infringement of those programs, the defendants first argued that
the programs were mere forms, not intended to convey information, and thus not
subject to copyright protection. Id. at 1011. Second, the defendants maintained that
the "idea" behind the plaintiff's programs and the "expression" contained therein
were inseparable, and therefore the permissible use of the unprotectable idea alone
necessarily required use of the expression. Id. at 1012.
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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sion." 51 However, the court held that the ideas expressed in the input for-
mats could be expressed only by using the identical sequence and
arrangement of those formats, and that accordingly the idea and its expres-
sion were inseparable. 52 Therefore, the court held that the use of the formats
did not constitute infringement. 53 The Snercom decision was the first to indi-
cate that computer programs were potentially copyrightable, but the court
also suggested that any computer program was likely to fail the idea-expres-
sion test of Baker and Morrsse.
5 4
Another court denied copyright protection to a computer program in
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v.JS&A Group, Inc.55 There, the creator of a hand-held
computer chess game alleged infringement of a copyrighted program in-
scribed in object code on a ROM. 56 The court applied the White-Smith rule
51. Id at 1012. The court distinguished Baker v. Selden on the basis that the
forms in Baker did not communicate any information. Id at 1011. In this case, by
comparison, the formats used communicated "the selection arrangements and the
sequence." Id at 1012. Thus the "formats" at issue in Synercom were clearly distin-
guishable from the mere blank "forms" involved in Baker. Id
52. Id at 1012-13. The court stated:
The difficult question is whether [the defendant] plagiarized Synercom's
idea or its expression. If the idea is the sequence and ordering of data, there
was no infringement. If sequencing and ordering of data was, however,
expression, it follows that [the defendants'] preprocessor program was
infringed.
Id at 1013. The court stated further: "The argument asks if the idea and the usage
are not separable, what is the expression?" Id. at 1012. Thus, whether the defend-
ants had infringed the plaintiff's copyright depended upon whether the expression
element could be distilled from the idea-expression complex. Id
53. Id at 1013-14. The court recognized that by making only a few variations of
the order of the format instructions, 3,628,800 possible manners of communicating
with the machine could be expressed. Id. at 1012. Nevertheless, the court found that
the defendant had appropriated only the idea expressed by the formats. Id The
court, in an admittedly "over-simplified" hypothetical, drew an analogy to the "fig-
ure H" pattern of an automobile shift stick, which like a computer format, may be
expressed in several different ways, including prose description, diagram, or photo-
graph. Id. at 1013.
Each of these expressions may presumably be protected through copyright.
But the copyright protects copying of the particular expressions of the pat-
tern, and does not prohibit another manufacturer from marketing a car
using the same pattern.
Id The stick-shift analogy illuminates the court's focus: whether the sequence of
data that makes up a computer program is an idea or an expression of the idea that
was the origin of the program. Id The question the court posed was: "If sequencing
and ordering is expression, what separable idea is expressed?" Id The court failed to
see any real distinction between the formats at issue and the H-shaped manual trans-
mission pattern. Id
54. See Reznick, supra note 44.
55. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. II1. 1979), aft'don other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th
Cir. 1980).
56. 480 F. Supp. at 1065-66. The plaintiff's game, "Compu Chess," used key-
board and data display devices to input and output information. Id at 1066. The
human player would enter a move on the keyboard device by pressing certain keys,
and the computer would then relay its move on a data display device. Id Because
1983-84]
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of readability 57 to conclude that a program in object code on a ROM is not
the ROMs in the plaintiffs and defendant's games were identical, the court assumed
that the defendant had copied the plaintiffs ROM. Id.
The Data Cash court began its discussion by describing the four stages of com-
puter programming. Id. at 1065. For a discussion of the stages of programming, see
note 4 supra. In describing the nature and function of object code programs, the
court explained that "[o]bject programs, which enter into the mechanical process
itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment and cannot be understood
by even the most highly trained programmers." 480 F. Supp. at 1065 (citing J.
BROWN & R. WORKMAN, How A COMPUTER SYSTEM WORKS 149-75 (1976);
Keplinger, Computer Intellectual Property Clabns. Computer Software & Data Base Protection,
1977 WASH. L.Q. 461, 464; Pope & Pope, supra note 4, at 530-31). This statement has
been criticized on several grounds. First, there is considerable disagreement over the
readability of programs in object code. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 22 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as CONTU REPORT] (concluding that object code programs are capable of
being understood by a skilled programmer); Keplinger, supra note 4, at 511 (noting
the fundamental disagreement between the Data Cash court and CONTU REPORT
on readability).
57. For a discussion of the White-Smith rule of readability, see notes 45-48 and
accompanying text supra. The Data Cash court determined that the case would not be
decided under the new 1976 Copyright Act. 480 F. Supp. at 1066. Section 117 of
Title 17, as revised by the 1976 Act, preserved the existing law as it related to the
scope of exclusive rights in copyrighted computer programs. Id at 1067. Section 117
provided in pertinent part,
[Tihis title [title 17] does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any
greater or lesser rights with respect to [computer programs] . . . than those
afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or
statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and
construed by a court in an action brought under this title.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2564 (repealed
1980). The section was designed as an interim provision, pending submission of a
report then being prepared by a special commission on the application of copyright
law to computer programs, at which point the 1976 Act was to include specific provi-
sions dealing with computer programs. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 116,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5731. For a discussion of the
commission's report, and its impact on the law, see notes 80-83 and accompanying
text tfra.
The Data Cash court interpreted § 117 as precluding application of the 1976 Act
to cases involving the copyrightability of computer programs. 480 F. Supp. at 1067.
Thus, the court decided the case under the 1909 Act, which left it free to apply White-
Smith. Id at 109. It has been suggested that the Data Cash court's reading of § 117
was incorrect. See Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171, 174-
75 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (the Data Cash court's interpretation of § 117 would create a
great loophole, unintended by Congress, allowing free copying of computer pro-
grams). The legislative history of § 117 supports this position by suggesting that
Congress intended that the section apply only to the question of the scope of exclusive
rights granted by the copyright statute in computer programs. "With respect to the
copyright-ability of computer programs, . . . the new statute would apply." H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5731.
The Data Cash court noted in dictum that even if the 1976 Act were applicable,
copyright protection thereunder would not extend to the object code of a computer
program. 480 F. Supp. at 1066-67 n.4. The court characterized object code as a
"mechanical device which is engaged in the computer to become an essential part of
the mechanical process." Id. (citations omitted).
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a "copy" of the original program as written in source code. 58 Under the
Data Cash approach, source programs and flow chart representations of pro-
grams are copyrightable expressions; however, the same program translated
into object code and embodied in a ROM is not subject to copyright protec-
tion because it is a mechanical device and is not a readable "copy." 59 This
holding was subsequently weakened when the case was affirmed, not on the
basis of the device/copy distinction, but on the ground that the plaintiffs
programs did not carry the requisite copyright notices.60
58. 480 F. Supp. at 1069. The court stated that the ROM chip in the defend-
ant's game was not a copy of the program originally developed by the plaintiff. Id
The court began its analysis by defining "copy" under the White-Smith requirement
of a form which others can see and read. Id Analogizing the source code-ROM
relationship to an architectural plan-completed building relationship, the court rea-
soned that the only "copy" of a computer program is "another computer program in
its flow chart or source phase because these are comparable technical writings." Id.
at 1068 (citing Nucor Corp. v. Tennessee Forging Steel Serv., 476 F.2d 386, 391 n.8
(8th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 755, 345 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959)). Since a ROM, by comparison, "is not in a form which one can
'see and read' with the naked eye, it is not a 'copy' " of the original source program.
480 F. Supp. at 1069. For a discussion of the White-Smith doctrine, see notes 46-48
and accompanying text supra.
59. 480 F. Supp. at 1068-69. The Data Cash approach to copyrightability of
computer programs has been generally criticized. See, e.g., Williams Electronics, Inc.
v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding copyrightability of object
code on ROM); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (ROM is within definition of "copy"), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir.), cert. dented,
104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775,
785 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (viewing the Seventh Circuit's treatment of Data Cash as "com-
pletely undermin[ing] the authority of the trial court's opinion"). But see Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 818 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(characterizing Data Cash as "definitive" and "persuasive"), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). One commentator has likened the
Data Cash decision to White-Smith. See MacGrady, Protection of Computer Software-An
Update and Practical Synthesis, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1033, 1042 (1983) ("Unquestionably,
Data Cash is the Piano Roll Case of computer software."). Other commentators have
generally characterized the Data Cash dictum, that the 1976 Act did not protect com-
puter programs in object code, as unnecessary and of questionable merit. See gener-
ally, Keplinger, supra note 4, at 510-11; Schmidt, Legal Proprietaiy Interests in Computer
Programs. The American Experience, 21 JURIMETRICS 345, 368 (1981); Comment, Copy-
right Protection for Computer Programs, supra note 4, at 804-05; Note, Computer Firmware, Is
It Copyrightable?, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 119, 126-29 (1983).
60. Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), afg on other
grounds, 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. 11. 1979). The court of appeals pointed out that the
district court's holding that a ROM was not a "copy" was neither briefed nor argued
on appeal. Id at 1041. Despite this, Professor Nimmer has suggested that the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision is an implicit reversal of the district court's reasoning. 2 M.
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 8.08 n.18. Nimmer notes that the circuit court affirmed
solely on the ground of the plaintiff's failure to affix a copyright notice to its program
encoded on a silicon ROM chip. Id Copyright notices are only required to be af-
fixed to "copies" and "phonorecords." 17 U.S.C. §§ 401(a), 402(a) (1982). Since a
ROM chip is not a "phonorecord," Nimmer concludes, the court of appeals must
have tacitly assumed that it was a "copy," despite the district court's suggestion to
the contrary. 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 8.08 n.18. Nimmer's theory was ac-
knowledged and at least tacitly approved by federal courts in recent cases. See Wil-
liams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple
18
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Despite the questionable status of computer programs 6 I engendered by
the Baker and White-Smith doctrines as applied in Snercom and Data Cash, the
United States Copyright Office has accepted programs for copyright regis-
tration since 1961, under the "rule of doubt."'6 2 Partially in response to this
practice, Congress began in 1961 to work on a draft bill for a general revision
of the Copyright Act. 63 Several subsequent drafts of a revised bill were peri-
odically introduced into Congress through the early 1970's, but no action
was taken 64 until 1976, when Congress enacted a complete revision of the
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 784 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Tandy
Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
61. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5664 (indicating that Congress considered computer programs
to be copyrightable under the 1909 Act). Most commentators writing before passage
of the 1976 Act believed that they were protectable. See, e.g., Nimmer, New Technology
and the Law of Copyright. Reprography and Computers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 931 (1968);
Prasinos, Worldwide Protecti'on of Computer Programs by Copyright, 4 RUTGERS J. COM-
PUTERS & L. 42 (1974); Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1274 (1964); Note, Adequate Protection for Computer Programs, supra note 21. But see
Scafetta, Computer Sofiware Protection. The Copyright Revision Bills and Alternatives, 8 J.
MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 381 (1975); Comment, Computer Program Protection. The Need to
Legislate a Solution, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 586 (1969); Note, Computer Software.- Beyond
the Limits of Existig PropretaV Protection Policy, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 116 (1973).
62. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS (1964), reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 361 (1964).
The Copyright Office stated:
The registrability of computer programs involves two basic questions:
(1) Whether a program as such is the "writing of an author" and thus copy-
rightable, and (2) whether a reproduction of the program in a form actually
used to operate or be "read" by a machine is a "copy" that can be accepted
for copyright registration.
Both of these are doubtful questions. However, in accordance with its pol-
icy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registration wherever possible, the
Copyright Office will consider registration for a computer program ...
Id at 361. The Copyright Office continued to accept computer programs for copy-
right registration under the 1909 Act until the last day it was in effect. See Keplinger,
supra note 4, at 495. When the 1976 Act took effect on Jan. 1, 1978, the Copyright
Office had registered approximately 2,000 programs. Id
63. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5660. The draft bill was not finalized and introduced into
Congress until 1964. Id The bill provided that the exclusive rights comprised in
copyright "shall include the exclusive right to copy or record the work in any tangi-
ble medium of expression now known or later developed, from which it can be visu-
ally or aurally perceived, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUS-
SION AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 4 (Comm. Print 1964).
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 49-50, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5662-63. It is noteworthy that the Register of Copyrights, in
introducing the 1965 revision, explained the statute's scheme of using general prefa-
tory language: "[T]he approach ...is to state the general concepts of copyright in
language allow[ing] for future changes in patterns of reproduction and other uses of
authors' works. At the same time, . . . [i]t contemplates that certain computer uses
would come within the copyright owner's exclusive rights." HOUSE JUDICIARY
COMM., 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: PART 6, SUPPLEMEN-
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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Copyright Act. 6 5
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright protec-
tion to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expres-
sion." 66 The requirement of originality was purposely left undefined, as
Congress "intended to incorporate without change the standard of original-
ity established by the courts under the . . . [1909] copyright statute."' 67 The
second requirement of section 102(a), fixation in a tangible medium of ex-
pression, is satisfied when a work's embodiment in a "copy" is sufficiently
permanent to permit it to be "perceived, reproduced or otherwise communi-
cated" for a period of more than transitory duration.6 In addition, the Act
explicitly broadened the scope of potential "media" for fixation by allowing
for any medium "now known or later developed." 69 The legislative history
of section 102(a) indicates that Congress deliberately used this broad lan-
guage in order to avoid the artificial distinctions engendered by White-Smith's
requirement that a work be capable of human perception and understand-
ing to be a "copy."
70
TARY REPORT OF REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON GENERAL REVISION OF U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW, 1965 REVISION BILL 18 (Comm. Print 1965). For a detailed discussion
of the several proposed drafts for a revised copyright statute, see Keplinger, supra note
4, at 495-99.
65. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as "1976 Act"].
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). The section provides in pertinent part as follows:
Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Id Section 102 lists seven broad categories of "works of authorship":
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
d. The legislative history of the section makes it clear that the list is intended to be
merely illustrative and not exhaustive. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 53,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5666.
67. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5664. For a discussion of the judicially created standard of original-
ity under the 1909 statute, see note 28 supra.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). This section defines "copies" as "material objects
• . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from
which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). For the text of§ 102(a), see note 66 supra.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 52, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5665. The House Report, after explicitly repudiating the
"largely unjustifiable distinctions derived" from While-Smith, states:
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of
fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes . . . or any other
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in . . .
1983-84]
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The broad scope of protection afforded by section 102(a) is limited by
section 102(b), which excludes from copyright protection "any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, [or] method of operation."' 7' As such, section 102(b)
codifies the two fundamental principles of Baker v. Selden: copyright cannot
subsist in either ideas or utilitarian processes. 72 The legislative history of
section 102(b) indicates that it was intended to limit the scope of protection
available for computer programs, by restricting copyrightability to the
"writing" involved in a program and excluding processes or methods of
operation.
73
The broadly drafted language of section 102, as well as the legislative
history of the 1976 Act, seemed to suggest that computer programs were
intended to be included within the scope of the Act's protection. 74 The
punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it L capable ofper-
ception directly or by means of any machine or device "now known or later developed"
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the White-Smith doctrine, see notes 46-48
and accompanying text supra.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). The section provides as follows: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." Id.
72. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670. For a discussion of Baker v. Selden and the
copyrightability of ideas or utilitarian processes, see notes 35-40 and accompanying
text supra. The House Report specifically states that § 102(b) was not intended to
enlarge or contract in any way the scope of copyright protection that existed prior to
the 1976 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670. Rather, "[i]ts purpose is to restate, in the context
of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between
expression and idea remains unchanged." Id
73. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670. The House Report states as follows:
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs
should extend protection to the methodology or processes adopted by the
programmer, rather than merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Sec-
tion 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expres-
sion adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a
computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in
the program are not within the scope of the copyright law.
Id
74. For the text of § 102, see notes 66 & 71 supra. The category of "literary
works," one of the seven enumerated categories of "works of authorship" protected
under § 102(a), is broadly defined as "works ...expressed in words, numbers, or
other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material
objects, such as ...tapes, disks or cards, in which they are embodied." ' 7 U.S.C.
§ 101 (1982). Arguably, this definition is sufficiently broad to encompass computer
programs. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.04[C].
See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5667. The House Report states:
The term "literary '.:orks" does not connote any criterion of literary merit
or qualitative value: it includes catalogs, directories, and similar factual,
reference, or instructional works and compilations of data. It also includes
computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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Northern District of California drew this conclusion in Tandy Corp. v. Personal
Miro Computers, Inc. ,'75 and held that an operating system program enscribed
on a ROM is copyrightable. 76 Rejecting the Data Cash court's approach, 77
the Tandy court found an operating system program to be a "work of author-
ship," and a ROM to be a "tangible medium of expression" within the
meaning of section 102(a). 78
The 1976 Act, as originally drafted, was a significant step in providing
copyright protection for computer programs; however, the drafters explicitly
indicated that the Act was not intended to constitute a definitive answer to
the computer program question. 79 In 1974, while the 1976 Act was still in
authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distin-
guished from the ideas themselves.
Id., reprmntedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5669 (emphasis added). While
the House Report indicates congressional acceptance of computer programs under
the 1976 Act, the Senate Report accompanying that Act does not explicitly refer to
computer programs in discussing the scope of § 102(a). See S. REP. No. 473, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1975). Nimmer has suggested that this omission was intentional. See
I M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.04[C] n.21. However, the Senate Report does state
that § 102(b) was intended to limit the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs. See S. REP. No. 473, supra, at 54. Nimmer has characterized this reference
as a "tacit assumption" on the part of the Senate that computer programs were to be
copyrightable under the 1976 Act. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.04[C] n.21.
75. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In Tandy, the plaintiff, a manufacturer
of a personal home computer, the Radio Shack TRS-80, alleged that the defendants
copied an operating system program that translated high-level source code into
machine-readable object code. Id at 173. The program was stored on a ROM. Id
The defendants moved to dismiss the action, contending that ROM silicon chips are
not "copies" of the original program written in source code and, therefore, are
outside the scope of copyright protection under the doctrine of White-Smith. Id. For a
discussion of the White-Smith doctrine, see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
76. 524 F. Supp. at 173. The Tandy court rejected the defendants' argument, set
forth in Data Cash, that § 117 of the 1976 Act precluded application of the substan-
tive provisions of that Act to computer programs. Id at 174-75. The court observed
first that § 117 made clear on its face that it was not intended to modify § 102 on
copyrightability, but rather to explain §§ 106-118, which contain limitations on the
scope of protection afforded by § 102. Id at 174. The court stated that § 117 was
intended to address the problem caused by the inputting of properly copyrighted
materials, such as books, into computers. Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note
23, at 116, repnntedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5731). Thus, the court
concluded that pre-1976 Act law would not apply to the determination of
copyrightability. Id
77. For a discussion of the approach taken by the Data Cash court to the inter-
pretation of § 117, see note 57 supra.
78. 524 F. Supp. at 173. The Tandy court first stated that computer programs
are "works of authorship" covered by § 102(a) of the Copyright Act, noting that the
legislative history indicated congressional intent to extend protection to such pro-
grams. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5664). Further, the court noted that the imprinting of a
silicon chip (such as a ROM) with a program "falls easily" into the definition of
"fixed" in § 102(a). Id (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 52, reprintedin
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5665).
79. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 1. During the hearings conducted on
the proposed revision of the copyright statute, it became clear that computer pro-
grams raised many questions that were not dealt with in the proposed revision. Id
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draft form, Congress established the National Commission on New Techno-
logical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)8 0 for the purposes of con-
ducting a detailed study and making specific recommendations for
amendments to address the protection of computer programs by copyright. 8 '
In 1979, CONTU issued its final report, recommending that computer pro-
grams be given explicit recognition as copyrightable works, subject to spe-
cific limitations.
8 2
Because of the complexity of these problems, Congress deferred passing on specific
questions relating to the copyrightability of computer programs in the 1976 Act. Id
80. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873.
81. Id § 201, 88 Stat. at 1873-74. The enabling legislation specifically author-
ized CONTU to recommend copyright legislation relating to "the creation of new
works by the application or intervention of automatic systems." Id § 201(b)(2), 88
Stat. at 1873-74. The Commission, after expressing its unanimous view that com-
puter programs were entitled to some form of copyright protection, outlined the
objectives to be achieved by legislative amendment as follows:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemination of these
works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power than is neces-
sary to achieve the incentive to create.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 12.
82. CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 1. Specifically, CONTU recommended:
The new copyright law should be amended: (1) to make it explicit that
computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original
creation, are proper subject matter for copyright; (2) to apply to all com-
puter uses of copyrighted programs by the deletion of the present section
117; and (3) to ensure that rightful possessors of'copies of computer pro-
grams may use or adapt those copies for their own use.
Id.
The CONTU Report indicates the Commission's belief that the addition of a
definition of a computer program would automatically extend copyright protection
to programs. CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 12. The Commission also recog-
nized the uncertainty surrounding the existing § 117's application to computer
programs:
The 1976 Act, without change, makes it clear that the placement of any
copyrighted work into a computer is the preparation of a copy and, there-
fore, a potential infringement of copyright. Section 117, designed to subject
computer uses of copyrighted works to treatment under the old law, vitiates
that proscription, at least insofar as machine-readable versions are not copzls
under the 1909 Act. Therefore, to prevent any question concerning the im-
propriety of program piracy and to assure that all works of authorship are
treated comparably under the new law, section 117 should be repealed.
Id at 12-13 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). For a discusssion of judicial
interpretation of the applicability of the original § 117, see notes 57 & 76 supra.
Commissioner John Hersey, the only member of the Commission from the "liter-
ary world," wrote a strong dissent to the recommendations. CONTU REPORT, supra
note 56, at 27. He expressed the view, first posited in White-Smith, that copyright
should be reserved for works that communicate directly with human beings. Id at
29-30. Commissioner Hersey stated that because computer programs in their object
code stages communicate only with a machine, they should not be eligible for copy-
right protection:
It is clear that the machine control phase of a computer program is not
designed to be read by anyone; it is designed to do electronic work that
[Vol. 29: p. 894
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In 1980, Congress amended the 1976 Act to incorporate the CONTU
recommendations verbatim, including the definition of "computer program"
and specific limitations on the exclusive rights of copyright holders in com-
puter programs.8 3 While the 1980 amendment finally erased remaining
doubts as to the copyrightability of computer programs in general and appli-
cation programs in particular, it did not clearly define the scope of the pro-
tection afforded and the extent of its limitations.8 4 Specifically, the 1980
amendment does not explicitly address programs written in object code, as
opposed to source code.8 5 Further, the amendment is silent on the issue of
protection for operating system programs.
In Wilhams Electronics, Inc. v. Ar/ic International, Inc.,86 the Third Circuit
upheld the copyrightability of an application program written in object code
enscribed on a ROM.8 7 The court rejected any distinction between source
substitutes for the very much greater human labor that would be required
to get the desired mechanical result. . . The Commission report thus rec-
ommends affording copyright protection to a labor-saving mechanical
device.
Id. at 30 (footnote omitted). Commissioner Hersey finally noted that computer pro-
grams should not be amenable to copyright protection under the Baker V. Selden pro-
scription against copyright of purely utilitarian works. Id. at 31. For a discussion of
Baker v. Se/den, see notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra. Commissioner Hersey
urged that copyright law should distinguish between application systems and operat-
ing systems: while the former would be protected, the latter would not, as they are
part of the machine, thus becoming utilitarian objects. Id.
83. Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)). The definition of "computer pro-
grams" reads as follows: "A set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a desired result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982). The new § 117 provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106. . .it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and
that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation
is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the
event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
Id. § 117.
84. Most commentators agree that there is no longer any question of the
copyrightability of application programs in their source code stage. See, e.g., 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 11, § 2.04[C]; Keplinger, supra note 4; Note, Object Code Protection,
supra note 9.
85. See Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the /980 Act Do
Anythingfor Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 1 (1981) (object code programs are prop-
erly excluded from the scope of the amended Copyright Act; a program in object
code is not a "copy" of a protectable work, since object code is itself unintelligible).
Contra Note, Object Code Protection, supra note 9 (object code copyrightable).
86. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
87. Id Witiams involved a challenge to the copyrightability of computer pro-
grams controlling the audiovisual effects of a video game ("attract" and "play"
modes). Id at 872. The programs were written in object code and stored on a ROM.
Id The defendant did not dispute the lower court's findings that defendant had
1983-84]
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code and object code for copyright purposes, observing that affording protec-
tion for a program written in source code, but not for that same program
translated into object code, would create an enormous loophole by which
infringers could easily circumvent the copyright law.8 8 According to the
Wiiams court, object code fixed on a ROM constitutes a work of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.89
While the Williams court did not address the issue of the
copied the plaintiff's program, but challenged the finding that the copyrights on the
programs were valid. Id. at 873.
88. Id at 877. The defendant first argued that the programs failed to meet the
"fixation" requirements of § 102(a) of the Copyright Act, claiming that audiovisual
game images are transient, and that players of the game are in effect co-authors,
because of their unique interaction with the game. Id at 873-74. The court rejected
these arguments, finding that there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial
portion of audiovisual games and that the fixation requirement is satisfied whenever
a work is capable of being "reproduced or otherwise communicated." Id. (quoting 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
The defendant then asserted that a program written in object code stored on a
ROM is a utilitarian object or machine part, thus precluding copyright protection.
Id at 874. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the plaintiff was
merely attempting to protect its artistic expression (the audiovisual aspects of the
game that appear on the screen), not to restrict the use of the ROMs. Id. at 874-75
(quoting Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.) (video games
held copyrightable even when encoded on a ROM), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983)).
The defendant next argued that while source code may be protected under the
1980 Act, the object code version of the program was not protected, because "a 'copy'
must be intelligible to human beings and must be intended as a medium of commu-
nication to human beings." Id at 876-77. In so contending, the defendant relied on
the distinction first posited in White-Smith, and applied in the context of computer
programs by Data Cash. Id at 877. For a discussion of the White-Smth rule of reada-
bility, see notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the Data Cash
application of that rule to computer programs, see notes 58-59 and accompanying
text supra. The Third Circuit expressly and somewhat harshly rejected the notion
that this distinction had any continuing vitality. 685 F.2d at 877. The court instead
pointed to the language of the 1980 Act, which broadly defines "copy" to include "by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." Id (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101) (emphasis added by the court). Under the
statutory definition, the court concluded that a program written in object code is a
"copy" of the original source program. Id The court observed that affording protec-
tion only to source code but not object code would result in the creation of "an
unlimited loophole by which infringement of a computer program is limited to copy-
ing of the computer program text but not to duplication of a computer program fixed
on a silicon chip." Id (citing Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981)).
89. 685 F.2d at 874-77. Other cases have held that application programs uti-
lized in audiovisual works, particularly video games, are copyrightable. See, e.g.,
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) (video games
copyrightable), affg 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Il. 1982); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kauf-
man, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (audiovisual display of a video game is sufficiently
"fixed" on a ROM to be copyrightable); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp.
741. (N.D. Ill. 1983) (video game program stored on ROM constitutes protectable
"literary work"); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(video game copyrightable); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222
(D. Md. 1981) (same); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb.
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copyrightability of operating systems, that question was answered in the af-
firmative in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc.90 In holding that
operating systems were copyrightable, the District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California followed Williams and Tand and extended copyright pro-
tection to programs written in object code on ROMs.9 ' The court also
rejected the defendant's attempt to distinguish application programs from
operating systems for copyright purposes. 92 All computer programs, accord-
ing to the Formula International court, are copyrightable under the Copyright
Act.
9 3
Against this background, the Third Circuit considered the question of
whether a computer operating system, expressed in object code and embod-
ied on a ROM, is copyrightable. 94 Because the Third Circuit could not pre-
1981) (attract and play modes of video game copyrightable as an "audiovisual
work").
90. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Apple v. Formula Int'l, the Apple Corporation filed suit against the operator of an elec-
tronics supply store, alleging that defendant's build-it-yourself personal computer,
the "Pineapple," contained operating systems virtually identical to those of the Apple
II computer. Id at 777. The programs involved were the same as those at issue in
the principal case. Id at 778. For a description of those programs, see note 14 supra.
91. 562 F. Supp. at 779. For a discussion of Wihams, see notes 86-89 and ac-
companying text supra. For a discussion of Tanv, see notes 75-78 and accompanying
text supra.
92. 562 F. Supp. at 780-81. The defendant relied on § 102(b)'s proscription
against copyright of any "idea, procedure, system [or] method of operation," which it
traced to the Baker v. Selden doctrine. Id. at 780. The defendant argued that operat-
ing systems fall squarely within this prohibition since these programs are designed
solely to control computer functions rather than to produce any discernible "expres-
sion" to the human user. Id. However, the court rejected these contentions, noting
that both application and operating system programs are designed to operate a com-
puter in a way that will ultimately produce some meaningful communication to the
user. Id The court stated:
It is difficult to understand how they can be classified into two categories
for copyright purposes, with protection afforded to one category and not the
other, based on whether they directly generate that communication or
whether they merely direct certain machine functions which eventually re-
sult in that expression. Either all computer programs so embodied are
within the terms "idea, procedure, system, method of operation" and are
excluded, or all of them are outside those terms and thus protectable.
There is nothing in any of the statutory terms which suggests a different
result for different types of computer programs based upon the function
they serve within the machine.
Id. See also GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (object
code version of registered source code operating system programs is the same work
and is protected).
93. 562 F. Supp. at 780-81. The court found it appropriate, in dictum, to dis-
cuss and distinguish the district court's opinion in the principal case. Id at 784-85
(citing Frank/in, 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984)). After noting the factual similarities between the
two cases, the court declined to follow the district court's holding, finding that deci-
sion to have been "greatly undermined" by the Third Circuit's decision in Wiliams.
Id. at 785.
94. 714 F.2d at 1246. The issue came before the Third Circuit in an appeal
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cisely determine the basis for the district court's view that such a program
was not copyrightable, 9 5 the Third Circuit divided the inquiry into three
analytical steps: (1) whether copyright can exist in a computer program
expressed in object code; (2) whether copyright can exist in a computer pro-
gram embedded on a ROM; and (3) whether copyright can exist in an oper-
ating system program.96
The Third Circuit stated that the legislative history of the 1976 Copy-
right Act and its prior decision in Williams Electronics v. Artic International, Inc.
established that programs expressed in object code are proper subjects of
copyright.9 7 The court noted that Williams had interpreted the 1980 amend-
ments to the Act as "firmly establish[ing]" the copyrightability of computer
programs in general. 98 The court felt that the definition of "computer pro-
gram" adopted in 1980 encompassed programs in both object code and
source code, because it refers to instructions "used directly or indirectly" by
a computer.99 The Third Circuit reasoned that since only programs in ob-
ject code can be used directly by a computer, this language must have been
from the district court's denial of an injunction against Franklin's copyright infringe-
ment. Id at 1242. Judge Sloviter, writing for the Third Circuit, stated by way of
introduction: "This legal ruling is fundamental to all future proceedings in this ac-
tion and, as the parties and amici curiae seem to agree, has considerable significance
in the computer services industry." Id. (footnote omitted).
95. 714 F.2d at 1245-46. For a discussion of the district court's reasons for deny-
ing the injunction, see notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra. The Third Circuit
noted the difficulty of discerning the exact grounds upon which the district court had
denied Apple's motion for a preliminary injunction, "since there is no finding, state-
ment, or holding on which we can focus which clearly sets forth the district court's
views." Id at 1246. Finding mostly "generalized concerns" expressed by the district
court, the Third Circuit surmised that the district court had found that programs
written in object code on ROMs were not copyrightable. Id
96. Id. at 1246. The Third Circuit also identified a fourth issue on appeal:
"[Wihether independent irreparable harm must be shown for a preliminary injunc-
tion in copyright infringement actions." Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
resolution of the issue of irreparable harm, see notes 122-24 and accompanying text
infra.
97. 714 F.2d at 1246-47 (citing Williams, 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982)). For a
discussion of Williams, see notes 86-89 and accompanying text supra. The court
briefly reviewed the basic requirements of copyright under the 1976 Act. 714 F.2d at
1246-47. For a discussion of the statutory requirements for copyrightability, see notes
66-69 and accompanying text supra.
98. 714 F.2d at 1248 (quoting Williams, 685 F.2d at 875). The Franklin court
pointed out that the 1980 amendments had carved out an exception to the general
prohibition against copying to permit computer programs to be duplicated for their
owners' use under certain circumstances. Id at 1248 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982))
("it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy" when necessary "to the utilization of the com-
puter program" or "for archival purposes only"). The Third Circuit believed that
this language, and the CONTU Report which engendered it, clearly indicated that
computer programs are copyrightable and that any unauthorized copying of a pro-
gram constitutes an actionable infringement. Id at 1248. For a discussion of the
1980 amendment, see note 83 supra.
99. 714 F.2d at 1248 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). For the text of the defi-
nition of "computer program," see note 83 supra.
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intended to cover object code. 100 The court also noted that Williams had
rejected the argument that source code programs should be distinguished
from object code for purposes of copyright protection.' 0 ' Finally, the court
rejected the argument that object code could not constitute a "literary
work," remarking that the broad copyrightable category of "literary works"
in section 102 of the Act "is not confined to literature in the nature of Hem-
ingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls."'10 2
The court then turned to the second question of whether the embodi-
ment of a computer program on a ROM precludes its copyrightability. 10 3
The court noted that Wil/ams had rejected the argument that works en-
scribed on ROMs were not copyrightable because they are utilitarian objects
or machine parts. 10 4 The Frank/hi court reaffirmed Williams' holding that
the statutory requirement of "fixation" in a tangible medium of expres-
sion' 0 5 is satisfied by a program's embodiment on a ROM, and therefore a
program written in object code on a ROM is an appropriate subject of
100. 714 F.2d at 1248 (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741,
750-51 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). The court explained that source code programs must be
translated into object code to be acted upon by the computer, and so concluded that
only object code instructions are "directly" used by a computer. 714 F.2d at 1248.
Further, the court noted that the CONTU majority had urged this broad definition
because it took the position that object code is copyrightable. Id.
The Apple court noted that CONTU had considered and rejected the view that
the definition of computer program should distinguish between the "machine control
phase" of a computer program and the phase directed at a human audience. Id.
(citing CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 28-30 (dissent of Comm'r Hersey)). Be-
cause no such distinction was included in the Act, the Third Circuit disapproved the
district court's reliance on the common law doctrine of White-Smith "that
copyrightability depends on a communicative function to individuals." 714 F.2d at
1248 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit stated: "[I]t is clear from the language of
the 1976 Act and its legislative history that it was intended to obliterate distinctions
engendered by White-Smith." Id. For a discussion of the White-Smith doctrine, see
notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the CONTU Report,
see notes 80-82 and accompanying text supra.
101. 714 F.2d at 1248 (citing Williams, 685 F.2d at 876).
102. 714 F.2d at 1249. For the text of the definition of "literary works," see note
74 supra. The court observed that "literary works" includes works expressed in num-
bers or other numerical symbols. Id (citing Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v.
Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reiss v. National
Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921)). Because a computer program is
expressed in such symbols, the court concluded that it is a literary work regardless of
whether it is expressed in source code or object code. d (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 750-51 (N.D. I11. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718, 719-20 (N.D. Cal. 1982)).
103. 714 F.2d at 1249. The court stated that the district court had suggested
"that [the] embodiment of a computer program on a ROM, as distinguished from in
a traditional writing, detracts from its copyrightability." d The court stated that
this possibility had been rejected in the Third Circuit's opinion in Williams, which
was handed down three days after the district court's decision. Id.
104. Id.








Reaching what it characterized as the "heart" of the case, the Frankh
court considered whether operating system programs are copyrightable.1
0 7
Franklin argued, first, that an operating system is a "process, system, [or]
method of operation" and is per se excluded from copyright protection
under section 102(b).' 0 8 The Third Circuit responded that Apple was not
seeking to protect the actual method by which its program instructs the com-
puter to perform, but rather the instructions themselves; hence the court did
not regard section 102(b) as a bar to copyrightability. ° 9 The court stated
that Franklin's argument "mistakenly focuse[d] on the physical characteris-
tics of the instructions," confusing the "medium" with the "message."' o
106. 714 F.2d at 1249. The Frankh court stated that Whlliams had held that the
statutory requirement of "fixation" is satisfied by a ROM embodying the expression
that a program represents. Id. (citing Williams, 685 F.2d at 874, 876; Stern Elec., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855-56 (2d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564
F. Supp. 741, 751-52 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers,
Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981)). The court therefore reaffirmed that a
computer program written in object code enscribed on a ROM is copyrightable. Id
107. 714 F.2d at 1249-50. The court began by rejecting Apple's contention that
the question of the copyrightability of operating system programs was also controlled
by Williams, noting that the question was not even considered in that case because
the Williams controversy involved only application programs. Id. Thus, the issue was
one of first impression for the Third Circuit. Id. at 1250. For a discussion of the
Wlhams holding with respect to application programs, see notes 86-89 and accompa-
nying text supra. For a discussion of the distinction between operating system pro-
grams and application programs, see notes 6-8 supra.
108. 714 F.2d at 1250. For the complete text of§ 102(b), see note 71 supra. The
court explained that § 102(b) is a codification of a substantial portion of the holding
and dictum of Baker v. Selden. 714 F.2d at 1250. The "process, system, or method of
operation" exclusion related to Baker's distinction between discoveries, which are pro-
tectable only under patent law, and writings about discoveries, which are within the
scope of copyright law. Id.
109. 714 F.2d at 1251. The court noted that the actual method used to instruct
the computer would be protected, if at all, by patent law. Id. The court further
observed that the question of the applicability of patent law protection to computer
programs is unresolved. Id (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)). For a
discussion of patent law in the context of computer programs, see note 21 supra.
110. 714 F.2d at 1251. The court explained that the fact that an operating sys-
tem program may be etched on a ROM does not make it part of a machine. Id This
is apparent, the court pointed out, since one operating system need not be perma-
nently imprinted in the machine on a ROM, but may be imprinted on another me-
dium such as a diskette or magnetic tape. Id
The Frankhn court characterized Franklin's argument regarding operating sys-
tems as "inconsistent" with Franklin's concession that application programs were
properly protectable under the Copyright Act. Id Since both types of programs
instruct the computer to do something, the court found no reason to distinguish an
application program instruction which, for example, instructs a computer to prepare
a tax return, and an operating system instruction which translates source code into
object code. Id. The court stated:
Since it is only the instructions which are protected, a "process" is no more
involved because the instructions in an operating system program may be
used to activate the operation of the computer than it would be if instruc-
tions were written in ordinary English in a manual which described the
necessary steps to activate an intricate complicated machine.
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Franklin also argued, on the basis of dictum in Baker v. Selden, that oper-
ating systems are per se uncopyrightable because a copyright cannot exist in
a "purely utilitarian" work.1 1 The Third Circuit interpreted a more recent
Supreme Court case as rejecting the proposition that copyright is precluded
when the copyrighted work is put to a utilitarian use.1 12 Further, the court
cited the CONTU Report's interpretation of "copyright practice past and
present, which recognizes copyright protection for a work of authorship re-
gardless of the uses to which it may be put."' 1 13 Finally, the court noted its
special reliance on the fact that the statutory definition of computer program
does not distinguish between application and operating system programs,
nor had any court adopted such a distinction.' 14 The Third Circuit thus
refused to hold that operating system programs are per se excluded from
copyright. 115
The court turned to Franklin's second theory challenging the copyright
of operating system programs: that an operating system represents an idea,
which may not be copyrighted.1 16 The court explained that the common
law idea-expression dichotomy was codified in section 102(b) "to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element
Id. The court thus found no reason to extend less copyright protection to instructions
contained in an operating system than to the instructions contained in an application
program. Id
111. 714 F.2d at 1251 (quoting Baker, 101 U.S. at 103 ("where the art [the book]
teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illus-
trate the book . . . such methods and diagrams are to be considered as . . . given
• . . to the public. . . for the purpose of practical application")). The Third Circuit
refused to adopt a broad interpretation of this language. Id (citing Taylor Instru-
ment Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785
(1944) (interpreting Baker as forming the critical distinction between "objects of ex-
planation" and "objects of use")).
112. Id at 1251-52. The court rejected Franklin's reliance on the Baker v. Selden
prohibition against copyright in purely utilitarian works. Id The court stated that
the Supreme Court's decision in Mazerv. Stein rejected that expansive a reading of the
Baker doctrine. Id. (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954)).
113. 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 21). The
court noted that the Report should be viewed as accepted by Congress since Congress
adopted the recommendations of the majority almost verbatim. Id (citation
omitted).
114. Id. For the text of the statutory definition of "computer program," see note
83 supra. The court noted that the only other federal court to have considered a
possible distinction between application programs and operating systems reached the
conclusion that operating systems are not per se copyrightable. 714 F.2d at 1252
(quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. at 780). Furthermore,
the Third Circuit noted that other courts had upheld the copyrightability of operat-
ing systems without discussing the question. Id. (citing Tand Corp. . Personal Micro
Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. at 173; GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 719-20).
115. 714 F.2d at 1252.
116. Id at 1252-54. The Frank/in court recognized that the idea/expression di-
chotomy, drawn from Baker v. Selden, given full expression in Mazer v. Stein, and codi-
fied in § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, distinguishes works subject to copyright
protection from those given patent protection. Id at 1252-53. For a discussion of the
distinction between patent law and copyright law protection, see note 21 supra.
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in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied
in the program are not within the scope of copyright law." 117 Observing
that the line between the idea of a computer program and its expression is
often difficult to ascertain, the Frankh court stated that "the line must be a
pragmatic one" which focuses on "the preservation of the balance between
competition and protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws."' 8
The Third Circuit adopted a test which focuses upon whether the idea and
its expression have merged, or whether other programs can be written which
can perform the same function as the program in question.1 19 If no such
program can be designed without duplication, then there has been a merger
of the idea and its expression, and copyright protection would be precluded
under section 102(b). 120 The Third Circuit noted that the district court had
made no findings as to whether some or all of Apple's operating systems
could be rewritten and still perform the same function, and accordingly
stated that the necessary findings could be made on remand. 12 '
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's formulation of the
standard for issuance of a preliminary injunction, stating that a prima facie
showing of copyright infringement raises a presumption of irreparable
harm.1 22 Furthermore, the Frankhn court stated that even absent this pre-
117. 714 F.2d at 1252-53 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 57,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670).
118. Id at 1253 (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446
F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)).
119. Id The court explained that if a different program could be developed
which could perform the same function as one of Apple's operating system programs,
then that program is capable of being expressed in different modes. Id Therefore,
that program contains only one expression of the idea, not the idea itself, and is
copyrightable. Id The court recognized that the inquiry is whether there has been a
merger of an idea and its expression, which occurs when there is only one or a very
limited number of means of expressing a particular idea. Id (citing Morrissey, 379
F.2d at 678-79; Freedman v. Grolier Enters., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1973)). For a discussion of the merger doctrine, see notes 41-44 and accompanying
text supra.
120. 714 F.2d at 1253. For the text of § 102(b), see note 71 supra. The court
applied its test, by way of example, to the Applesoft program, the operating system
which translates source code into object code. 714 F.2d at 1253. The idea expressed
is the particular process: for example, translating source code into object code. Id.
The Applesoft program is Apple's expression of that idea. Id If another program
could be written which expresses that idea, i.e., which is capable of performing the
same translation, then the Applesoft expression would be copyrightable. Id The
court rejected Franklin's claim that merger had occurred since the Applesoft pro-
gram represented the only means of translating source into object code that would be
compatible with the application software developed for Apple, stating: "Franklin
may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently developed application
programs written for the Apple II, but that is a commercial and competitive objec-
tive which does not enter into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular
ideas and expressions have merged." Id
121. 714 F.2d at 1253. The Franklin court noted, however, that "there seems to
be a concession by Franklin that at least some of the programs [could] be rewritten."
Id
122. Id at 1254. The Third Circuit stated that the "prevailing view [holds] that
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sumption, the danger Franklin's copying posed to Apple's investment and
competitive position would be sufficient to establish irreparable harm.'
23
Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary
injunction and remanded the case. 124
In reviewing the Frank/in decision, it is submitted that the court properly
concluded that a computer program's enscription in object code onto a
ROM does not preclude copyrightability.' 25 The binary language repre-
sented by object code 12 6 is within the broad definition of "literary works,"
one of the categories of protected "works of authorship."'' 27 The legislative
history of the 1976 Act and the CONTU Report support the view that Con-
gress did not intend to distinguish programs written in source code and those
a showing of a prima facie case of copyright infringement or a reasonable likelihood
of success on the merits raises a presumption of irreparable harm." Id (citations
omitted).
123. Id The Third Circuit recognized the expense in time and money incurred
by Apple in developing its programs. Id The court then rejected the district court's
conclusion that Apple was better suited than Franklin to withstand the effects of
litigation because of the "devastating effect" a preliminary injunction would have on
Franklin's business. Id. at 1254-55. The court stated: "If that were the correct stan-
dard, then a knowing infringer would be permitted to construct its business around
its infringement, a result we cannot condone." Id. at 1255 (citations omitted).
124. Id at 1255. The Third Circuit observed that among the issues to be settled
on remand was the question of whether any of Apple's operating systems could be
rewritten, yet still perform the same function. Id at 1253. This would be the crucial
question in determining the copyrightability of Apple's programs. Id However, Ap-
ple and Franklin have settled the case, pursuant to a negotiated settlement agree-
ment, pursuant to which Franklin has agreed to redesign its operating systems. See
News In Brtef 52 U.S.L.W. 2393, 2394 Uan. 17, 1984). Thus, the question will remain
uncertain until a federal court provides additional guidance.
125. See 714 F.2d at 1249. See also Davidson, supra note 4, at 369. For a descrip-
tion of object code, see note 9 supra. For a description of ROM, see note 10 supra.
126. Object code is a specific language that expresses the idea envisioned by a
programmer when writing a program. See Note, Object Code Protection, supra note 9, at
1725. A programmer does not, of course, envision the program in its object code
state, but rather utilizes the higher level source code languages in writing the expres-
sion of the program's function. Id. However, because computer programs are capa-
ble of making automatic translations of source code into object code, the two versions
of the same program should be treated as one. See Davidson, supra note 4, at 368;
Note, Copyrightability of Object Code, supra note 9, at 419. The Frank/in district court
acknowledged that this automatic translation "establishes a predictable one-to-one
relationship between the two codes that preserves the programmer's original force of
authorship." 545 F. Supp. at 822 (citing GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718,
720 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (copyrighting only source code protects object code; both are
treated as one)).
127. For the definition of literary works, see note 74 supra. The definition specif-
ically includes "numerical symbols or indicia" as expressions of literary works. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982). Object code is a numerical language. See note 9 supra. Further,
the legislative history of the section expressly refers to computer programs as included
as literary works. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5667. See also Davidson, supra note 4, at 369; Note,
Object Code Protection, supra note 9, at 1727 ("Object code falls into the category of
'literary works.' . . .").
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written in object code for copyright purposes. 128 It is further submitted that
the fact that object code might not convey a perceptible expression to
humans has no bearing on the question of its copyrightability. 129 The Frank-
lin court correctly recognized that any requirement of readability has been
abrogated by the 1976 Act.13
0
It is also submitted that the Frank/n decision avoids the inherent danger
of according copyright protection only to computer programs written in
source code, but denying protection to the same programs when translated
into object code. Such "protection" would amount to a nullity, since a
trained programmer could freely copy the copyrighted program once it has
been compiled in object code.' 3'
Furthermore, it is submitted that a program's embodiment on a ROM
satisfies the statutory "fixation" requirement. ' 32 The Frank/in court correctly
rejected the argument that a ROM, when embedded in a computer, be-
128. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 52, reprited ten 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5665 ("Under the bill it makes no difference ... whether [the
expression] is in words, numbers ...or any other graphic or symbolic indicia.").
Since only object code, and not source code, is expressed by numerical symbols, this
language appears to refer specifically to object code. See also Note, Object Code Protec-
tion, supra note 9, at 1726-27. Similarly, the CONTU majority, after debating the
distinction between source code and object code, recommended that all computer
programs, regardless of the language in which they are expressed, be copyrightable.
See CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 1, 21, 25.
129. See Wi//ams, 685 F.2d at 876-77 (rejecting contention that in order to qual-
ify for copyright, a work "must be intelligible to human beings"). See also Reiss v.
National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. at 719 (a work's ability to communicate is not a
prerequisite to copyright protection). But see Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1069 (object
code enscribed on ROM is not readable with the naked eye and is therefore not a
"copy" of the original expression).
130. See 714 F.2d at 1248. It is submitted that the Frank/in court properly re-
jected the district court's application of the White-Smith doctrine to computer pro-
grams written in object code. The legislative history of the 1976 Act clearly manifests
congressional intent to abrogate the artificial and unworkable White-Smith rule of
readability. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 52, reprthtedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 5665. For a discussion of the White-Smith doctrine, see notes
46-48 and accompanying text supra.
131. See Wilams, 685 F.2d at 877 (protecting only source code and not object
code would create an "unlimited loophole" in the copyright law, allowing infringers
freedom to copy protected programs); Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 175 (lack of protection
of object code would render protection of source code "virtually meaningless"). See
also 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 8.08; Note, Object Code Protection, supra note 9, at
1744; Note, Copyrightabiity of Object Code, supra note 9, at 419 ("copyrighting the
source code alone is insufficient because a dedicated programming expert can deduce
the underlying object code from a copy of the source code").
132. The requirement of fixation is satisfied when a work is embodied in a
"copy" which is "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A computer program enscribed on a ROM is capable of
being perceived by a programmer, and is obviously capable of being reproduced. See
Wi/hams, 685 F.2d at 874; Stem Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d at 856 n.4; Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 547 F. Supp. at 1012-13; Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. For a
discussion of the fixation requirement, see notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
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comes a "machine part." 133 A ROM, whether or not permanently wired
into a computer, is a tangible object that contains an expression, and thus
fits within the statutory standard.
134
Finally, it is submitted that the Franklin court was correct in refusing to
hold that operating system programs are per se uncopyrightable.' 35 Neither
section 102(a) nor the definition of computer program provides a basis for
distinguishing application from operating systems turning on the function
each plays in a computer. 136 Both types of programs may interact with other
computer components, and both are capable of outputting information. 137
It has been suggested that only application programs are proper subjects of
copyright, because the execution of the program ultimately leads to commu-
nication with the human user. 138 Operating system programs interact only
with internal components of the computer itself.13 9 A program's failure to
create an ability to communicate to human beings, some courts and com-
mentators have concluded, precludes copyright because the program is not
an "expression" within the meaning of section 102(a). 140 It is submitted,
133. See 714 F.2d at 1249. The majority of courts that have faced this question
have agreed that a ROM does not become a "machine part," precluding
copyrightability of the program it contains, by becoming embedded in a computer.
See Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, 704 F.2d at 1009; Tandy,
524 F. Supp. at 173. But see Data Cash, 480 F. Supp. at 1069 (ROM encoded with
object code is a "mechanical tool or a machine part").
It is submitted that the contention that a ROM is a "machine part" miscon-
strues the nature and purpose of copyright protection by erroneously focusing on the
physical characteristics of the ROM itself. While a ROM that is permanently wired
into a computer can be considered part of the machine, it is not the ROM itself that
is protected by copyright law, but rather the written expression encoded upon it. See
Williams, 685 F.2d at 874; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 751; Note,
Copyright Protection of Object Code, supra note 9, at 1734.
134. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). For a discussion of the requirement of fixation,
see notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
135. See 714 F.2d at 1253.
136. For a text of § 102(a), see note 66 supra. For the definition of computer
program, see note 83 supra. For a description of operating system programs and
application programs, see notes 6 & 8 supra.
137. Sfe 714 F.2d at 1251. Davidson notes that some application programs re-
late only to internal components of the computer, while some operating system pro-
grams are able to output information directly to the computer user. See Davidson,
supra note 4, at 373.
138. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 10, at 7; Note, The Copyrightability of Object Code,
supra note 9, at 429. The argument is premised upon the language of § 102(a) and
the definition of "copy" in § 101 of the 1976 Act. Both sections require that a work
be capable of being "perceived, ieproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982). The
reference to "otherwise communicated" has been interpreted as implying a commu-
nicative ability requirement. See Note, The Copyrightability of Object Code, supra note 9,
at 429.
139. See 714 F.2d at 1243. For a discussion of operating system programs, see
note 8 supra.
140. See, e.g., Apple v. Frankh, 545 F. Supp. at 824 (copyright requires ability to
communicate to human beings), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104
S. Ct. 690 (1984); Note, The Copyrightabili'ty of Object Code, supra note 9, at 429-30 ("ex-
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however, that this argument misconceives the nature of copyright by focus-
ing only on thefnction performed by a program. Copyright does not protect
the actual function performed by a particular work, but protects only the
written expression of the work. 14 1 Ultimate ability to communicate directly
with a human audience is not required by the Copyright Act.
142
pression" requires human perceptibility). Commissioner Hersey's dissent to the
CONTU Report was similarly premised on the proposition that copyright may only
protect works that are capable of communicating directly with human beings. See
CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 29-30 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Commis-
sioner Hersey observed that an operating system program "communicates, if at all,
only with a machine." Id at 29 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Commissioner Nim-
mer, in a concurring opinion to the CONTU Report, arguably supports this position.
In his concurrence, Nimmer suggested that a future line of demarcation between
protectable and non-protectable computer programs may be drawn between pro-
grams which ultimately produce "works which themselves qualify for copyright pro-
tection" and those which do not. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 27
(Nimmer, Comm'r, concurring).
Thus, a program designed for use in conjunction with a legal information
retrieval system would be copyrightable, since the resulting enumeration of
cases on a given topic could claim copyright. A program designed for a
computer game would be copyrightable because the output would itself
constitute an audiovisual work. . . . On the other hand, programs which
control the heating and air-conditioning in a building, or which determine
the flow of fuel in an engine, or which control traffic signals would not be
eligible for copyright because their operations do not result in copyrightable
works.
Id This position, however, does not advocate distinguishing operating systems from
application programs on the principle of communication. Rather, Nimmer's focus is
on the content of a particular program.
141. See 714 F.2d at 1251 ("only the instructions .. . are protected"). The
Formula court similarly refused to distinguish computer programs on the basis of the
function they serve within the computer. Apple v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 780. For
the Formula court's discussion of this issue, see note 92 supra.
The CONTU majority explicitly rejected the distinction urged by Commissioner
Hersey, stating:
This distinction is not consistent with the design of the Act of 1976, which
was clearly to protect all works of authorship from the moment of their
fixation in any tangible medium of expression. Further, it does not square
with copyright practice past and present, which recognizes copyright pro-
tection for a work of authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be
put. . . . It follows, therefore, that there should be likewise no distinction
made between programs which are used in the production of further copy-
righted works and those which are not.
CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 21 (emphasis added). See also H.R. REP. No.
1476, supra note 23, at 57, reprnted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5670
("Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the
actual processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the
copyright law.") (emphasis added).
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of literary work), § 102(a). See also H.R.
REP. No. 1476, supra note 23, at 52, reprtktedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 5665 (if a work is capable of being perceived with the aid of a machine, it satisfies
the statutory requirement); CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 21. For a discussion
of the statutory standards for copyrightability, see notes 66-69 and accompanying
text supra.
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As the Frank/in court recognized, operating systems involve considera-:
tion of the idea-expression dichotomy and its attendant merger doctrine.1
4 3
It is submitted that the court properly focused, in the context of computer
programs, on the distinction between the function to be performed by a par-
ticular program (the idea), and the written instructions, or specific program
code, used to execute that function (the expression). 14 4 The merger inquiry
is therefore determined by the number of ways a program can be expressed
to perform a particular function. 145 The court, however, refused to consider
whether the goal of compatibility should properly be involved in defining a
program function, summarily dismissing compatibility as a "commercial and
competitive objective" not involved in the idea-expression analysis. 146 It is
submitted that this conclusion is questionable, for the goal of compatibility,
theoretically, may be critical in the determination of whether a program can
be rewritten to avoid a merger. If "idea" is so broadly construed as to con-
note merely the general, basic function of a particular program, there are
potentially an infinite number of ways to rewrite that program to perform
that function. 147 If, however, the "idea" is more narrowly construed as the
function of a program in a manner that will make it compatible with avail-
able application programs, then the possibilities for rewriting may be so re-
duced as to result in a merger of the function and the expression. 148
It is submitted that the goal of compatibility, while obviously "commer-
143. See 714 F.2d at 1252-54. For a discussion of the idea-expression dichotomy,
see notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
144. See 714 F.2d at 1253. The only other court that considered the question
specifically defined the "idea" of a computer program as "making the machine per-
form particular functions." Apple v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 783. Similarly, the
CONTU Commission identified "accomplishing a given task" as the idea represented
by a computer program. See CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 20. Davidson,
however, proposes a somewhat narrower interpretation of the ideas that are expressed
by an operating system program: "the manner in which the operating system reads
information from or stores it on a diskette, and the manner in which the operating
system translates programs written in certain computer programs written in certain
computer languages." Davidson, supra note 4, at 370.
145. See 714 F.2d at 1253. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of
the merger question, see notes 118-20 and accompanying test supra.
146. 714 F.2d at 1253.
147. See, e.g., CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 20 n.16 (quoting Dan Mc-
Cracken, Vice President of the Association for Computing Machinery, in response to
a Commission question of how many ways a given program could be rewritten, an-
swering, "[a]n infinite number in principle, and in practice dozens, hundreds").
148. Franklin articulated the problem as follows:
For example, if the idea of Apple's work, Auto-start ROM, is viewed as
simply the starting of any computer, then obviously there may be many
possible expressions of that. If the idea is viewed as starting a computer by
use of an operating system embedded in a ROM, the possible expressions of
that idea are fewer. If the idea is viewed as starting a computer that will be
compatible with a great percentage of the available application programs,
then the possible expressions of that idea may be fewer still. If the idea is
viewed as starting a computer that will be confpatible with most of the
available application programs, then the possible expressions of that view
may be so few as to constitute a merger of idea and expression.
1983-84]
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cial" in nature, also plays an important role in furthering the policy of pro-
moting competition in the computer industry. Allowing emerging computer
manufacturing companies to develop new computers that are largely com-
patible with existing application software is necessary to avoid a personal
computer market totally dominated by a few larger, well-established compa-
nies. 149 This policy, however, must be balanced against the competing pol-
icy interest of protecting the substantial investments made by large
computer companies in the research and development of new application
programs. 150 The Frankh decision represents an accommodation of these
two policies that results, at least under the facts of the case, in favoring the
protection policy.' 5' Small companies which need to achieve compatibility
with existing application programs will no longer be permitted to do so sim-
ply by copying the operating system programs of the computers for which
the application programs were initially designed. Between the two extremes
of slavish copying (which costs practically nothing) 152 and the original de-
velopment of all new compatible operating system programs (which requires
a tremendous financial investment)1 53 are a number of potential methods for
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
149. See, e.g., Apple v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 782. Defendant Formula appar-
ently made the market-dominance argument, which was characterized by the court
as a portrayal of "an attempt by a large established computer firm to preserve its
market position and hinder competition." Id. The Formula court, however, miscon-
strued the nature of the argument by responding that protecting operating system
programs through copyright will not hinder the growth of the "program-writing"
market. Id In fact, it is not the software market that is the focus of the argument, but
rather the hardware, or computer manufacturing market. Since the availability of
existing application programs is the primary consideration behind a consumer's deci-
sion in purchasing a computer, new companies must be able to produce computers
capable of running those programs in order to compete with industry giants such as
Apple. See Brief for Appellee at 6, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 690 (1984). See also 545
F. Supp. at 814. For a discussion of Franklin's concerns in developing an Apple-
compatible computer, see note 13 supra.
150. For a discussion of the costs to Apple of producing the programs involved
in the suit, see note 14 supra.
The Formula court articulated the importance of this policy:
Simple economics suggests that Formula's strategy would hinder, not pro-
mote, competition and innovation in the computer market. Few companies
are going to invest the time and resources to develop new programs if their
products can be freely duplicated by anyone. Such "competitors," who
could undersell the originator simply because they don't have its develop-
ment costs, would destroy the market which any innovater needs to recoup
his investment.
Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 783.
151. It is possible that the Frankhn court's quick dismissal of the validity of the
goal of compatibility was prompted, at least in part, by the fact that Franklin had
made no good faith attempt to develop compatible programs on its own, but simply
copied Apple's programs. See 714 F.2d at 1245.
152. See 714 F.2d at 1254; CONTU REPORT, supra note 56, at 11.
153. See note 14 supra.
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redesigning systems that can achieve substantial compatibility.1 54 These
methods, however, do require a significant financial outlay, 155 and it is possi-
ble that some of the smaller companies lack the financial resources required
for redesign. While the result may thus be a slight shrinkage in the com-
puter manufacturing industry, the Frankh decision, if followed in other cir-
cuits, 156 will ultimately foster fair competition by setting clearly-defined
limitations on acceptable methods of competing, and by prohibiting
software piracy.
Janet E Fisher
154. See, e.g., Apple v. Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 782 (Apple's competitors are free
to design programs to achieve compatibility, but some creative effort must be in-
volved). The Formula court noted that methods do exist whereby operating systems
can be designed that achieve 98% compatibility. Id One commentator has sug-
gested a method by which a new program may be written using the "functional
specification" contained in a given existing program that involves sufficient creative
effort to avoid any infringement. See Comment, Copyright Protection for Programs Stored
n Computer Chips, supra note 4, at 124-26.
155. See Comment, Copyright Protection for Programs Stored in Computer Chips, supra
note 4, at 128.
156. The Ninth Circuit has recently followed the Franklin court decision. See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984), aft'g 562 F.
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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